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Abstract
Implicit bias is the unconscious attribution of certain qualities (or lack thereof) to a member
from a particular social group (e.g., defined by gender or race). Studies on implicit bias have
shown that these unconscious stereotypes can have adverse outcomes in various social contexts,
such as job screening, teaching, or policing. Recently, [34] considered a mathematical model for
implicit bias and studied the effectiveness of the Rooney Rule as a constraint to improve the util-
ity of the outcome for certain cases of the subset selection problem. Here we study the problem
of designing interventions for a generalization of subset selection – ranking – which requires an
ordered set and is a central primitive in many social and computational contexts. We present a
family of simple and interpretable constraints and show that they can optimally mitigate the ef-
fect of implicit bias for a generalization of the model studied in [34]. Subsequently, we prove that
under natural distributional assumptions on the utilities of items, surprisingly, simple Rooney
Rule-like constraints can recover almost all of the utility lost due to implicit biases. Finally,
we augment our theoretical results with empirical findings on real-world distributions from the
IIT-JEE (2009) dataset and the Semantic Scholar Research corpus.
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1 Introduction
Implicit bias is the unconscious attribution of certain qualities (or lack thereof) to a member from
a particular social group defined by characteristics such as gender, origin, or race [27]. It is well
understood that implicit bias is a factor in adverse effects against sub-populations in many societal
contexts [1,6,42] as also highlighted by recent events in the popular press [22,38,61]. For instance, in
employment decisions, men are perceived as more competent and given a higher starting salary even
when qualifications are the same [52], and in managerial jobs, it was observed that women had to
show roughly twice as much evidence of competence as men to be seen as equally competent [37,59].
In education, implicit biases have been shown to exist in ways that exacerbate the achievement
gap for racial and ethnic minorities [53] and female students [41], and add to the large racial
disparities in school discipline which particularly affect black students’ school performance and
future prospects [45]. Beyond negatively impacting social opportunities, implicit biases have been
shown to put lives at stake as they are a factor in police decisions to shoot, negatively impacting
people who are black [20] and of other racial or ethnic minorities [48]. Furthermore, decision
making that relies on biased measures of quantities such as utility can not only adversely impact
those perceived more negatively, but can also lead to sub-optimal outcomes for those harboring
these unconscious biases.
To combat this, a significant effort has been placed in developing anti-bias training with the goal
of eliminating or reducing implicit biases [24, 39, 64]. However, such programs have been shown to
have limited efficacy [44]. Furthermore, as algorithms increasingly take over prediction and ranking
tasks, e.g., for ranking and shortlisting candidates for interview [8], algorithms can learn from and
encode existing biases present in past hiring data, e.g., against gender [21] or race [54], resulting in
algorithmic biases of their own. Hence, it is important to develop interventions that can mitigate
implicit biases and hence result in better outcomes.
As a running example we will consider hiring, although the interventions we describe would
apply to any domain in which people are selected or ranked. Hiring usually works in multiple
stages, where the candidates are first identified and ranked in order of their perceived relevance,
a shortlist of these candidates are then interviewed with more rigor, and finally a one or few of
them are hired [8]. The Rooney Rule is an intervention to combat biases during the shortlisting
phase, it requires the “shortlister” (an entity that shortlists) to select at least one candidate from
an underprivileged group for interview. It was originally introduced for coach positions in the
National Football League [19], and subsequently adopted by other industries [11, 28, 46, 50]. The
idea is that including the underprivileged candidates would give opportunity to these candidates,
with a higher (hidden or latent) potential. Whereas without the Rooney Rule these candidates
may not have been selected for interview. While the Rooney Rule appears to have been effective1
it is just one of many possible interventions one could design. How can we theoretically compare
two proposed interventions?
[34] study the Rooney Rule under a theoretical model of implicit bias, with two disjoint groups
Ga, Gb ⊆ [m] of m candidates, where Gb is the underprivileged group. Each candidate i ∈ [m]
has a true, latent utility wi ∈ R, which is the utility they would generate if hired, and an observed
utility wˆi ≤ wi, which is the shortlister’s (possibly biased) estimate of wi. The shortlister selects
n ≤ m candidates with the highest observed utility. For example, in the context of peer-review,
the latent utility of a candidate could be their total publications, and the observed utility could
be the total weight the reviewer assigns to the publications (“impact points” in [57]). They model
implicit bias as a multiplicative factor β ∈ [0, 1], where the observed utility is wˆi := β ·wi if i ∈ Gb,
1The representation of African-American coaches in NFL increased from 6% to 22% since Rooney Rule’s intro-
duction in 2002 to 2006 [19].
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and wˆi := wi if i ∈ Ga. [34] characterize conditions on n,m, β and the distribution of wi, where
Rooney rule increases the total utility of the selection.
However, before the shortlisting phase, applicants or potential candidates must be identified and
ranked. For example, LinkedIn Recruiter predicts a candidate’s “likelihood of being hired” from
their activity, Koru Hire analyzes a candidates (derived) personality traits to generate a “fit score”,
and HireVue “grades” candidates to produce an “insight score” [8]. In a ranking, the candidates
are ordered (in lieu of an intervention, by their observed utilities), and the utility of a ranking
is defined by a weighted sum of the latent utilities of the ranked candidates where the weight
decreases the farther down the ranking a candidate is placed. Such weighting when evaluating
rankings is common practice, and due to the fact that candidates placed lower in the list receive a
lower attention as compared to those placed higher [31]; this translates into being less likely to be
shortlisted, and contributing less to the total utility of the hiring process. Therefore, it becomes
important to consider interventions to mitigate bias in the ranking phase, and understand their
effectiveness in improving the ranking’s latent utility.
Can we construct simple and interpretable interventions that increase the latent utility of rank-
ings in the presence of implicit bias?
1.1 Our contributions
We consider the setting where items to be ranked may belong to multiple intersectional groups
and present a straightforward generalization of the implicit bias model in [34] for this setting. We
consider a set of interventions (phrased in terms of constraints) for the ranking problem which
require that a fixed number of candidates from the under privileged group(s) be represented in
the top k positions in the ranking for all k. We show that for any input to the ranking problem
– i.e., any set of utilities or bias – there is an intervention as above that leads to optimal latent
utility (Theorem 3.1). We then prove a structural result about the optimal ranking when all the
utilities are drawn from the same distribution, making no assumption on the distribution itself
(Theorem 3.2). This theorem gives a simple Rooney Rule-like intervention for ranking in the case
when there are two groups: For some α, require that in the top k positions, there are at least
α · k items from the underprivileged group. We then show that when the utilities are drawn from
the uniform distribution, the latent utility of a ranking that maximizes the biased utility but is
subject to our constraints (for an appropriate α) is close to that of the optimal latent utility
(Theorem 3.3). We evaluate the performance of ranking under our constraints empirically on two
real-world datasets, the IIT-JEE 2009 dataset (see Section 4) and the Semantics Scholar dataset
(see Section 7.2). In both cases we observe that our simple constraints significantly improve the
latent utility of the ranking, and in fact attain near-optimal latent utility. Finally, while we phrase
these results in the context of implicit bias, such interventions would be effective whenever the
observed utilities are systematically biased against a particular group.
1.2 Related work
There is a large body of work on studying the effects of bias in rankings, and designing algorithms
for ‘fair rankings’; see, e.g., [18, 35, 43, 49, 51]. We refer the reader to the excellent talk [10] that
gives an overview of work on fairness and transparency in rankings. A significant portion of these
works are devoted to generating unbiased rankings. For example, several approaches strive to learn
the latent utilities of items and output a ranking according to the learned values [4,62]. In contrast,
we do not strive to learn the latent utilities, rather, to find a ranking that is close to that given by
the (unknown) ranking according to the (unknown) latent utilities. A different approach instead
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considers constraints on the placement of individuals within the ranking depending on their group
status, e.g., enforcing that at least x% of the top k candidates be non-male [18, 25]. These works
take the constraints as input and develop algorithms to find the optimal feasible ranking. While we
also use constraints in our approach, our goal differs; we strive to show that such constraints can
recover the optimal latent utility ranking, and, where possible, derive the appropriate constraints
that achieve this.
Constraints which guarantee representation across various groups have been studied in a number
of works on fairness across various applications [12, 15–17, 29], most relevantly in works on forms
of subset selection [14] and ranking [18, 25, 63]. The primary goals of these works is to design
fast algorithms that satisfy the constraints towards satisfying certain definitions of fairness; these
fairness goals are given exogenously and the utilities are assumed to be unbiased. In contrast, we
begin with the premise that the utilities are systematically incorrect due to implicit bias, and use
the constraints to mitigate the effect of these biases when constructing a ranking. Our goal is to
determine how to construct effective interventions rather than on the algorithm for solving the
constraints; in fact, we use some of the works above as a black box for the subroutine of finding a
ranking once the constraints have been determined.
Studying implicit and explicit biases is a rich field in psychology [37, 48, 59], where studies
propose several mechanisms for origins of biases [47] and analyze present-day factors which can
influence them [23]. We point the reader to the seminal work on implicit biases [26], and the
excellent treatise [58] for an overview of the field. We consider one model of implicit bias inspired
by [34, 57]; however other relevant models may exist and exploring other kinds of bias and models
for capturing them could lead to interesting expansions of this work.
2 Ranking problem, bias model, and interventions
2.1 Ranking problem
In the classical ranking problem, one is given m items, where item i has utility wi, from which a
ranked list of n ≤ m items has to be outputted. A ranking is a one to one mapping from the set of
items [m] to the set of positions [n]. It is sometimes convenient to let x ∈ {0, 1}m×n denote a binary
assignment matrix representing a ranking, where xij = 1 if the i-th item is placed at position j, and
is 0 otherwise. Define a position-based discount v ∈ Rn≥0, where an item placed at position j ∈ [n],
contributes a latent utility of wi · vj . The latent utility obtained by placing an item i at position j
is then wivj . It is assumed that vj ≥ vj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1 implying that the same item derives
a higher utility at a lower position. This is satisfied by popularly studied position-based discounts
such as discounted cumulative gain (DCG) [31] where vk := 1/log(k+1) (and its variants) and Zipfian
where vk := 1/k [33]. Then, given v ∈ Rn≥ we define the latent utility of a ranking x as
W(x, v, w) :=
∑
i∈[m], j∈[n]
xijwivj . (Latent utility, 1)
The goal of the ranking problem is to find a ranking (equivalently, an assignment) that maximizes
the latent utility:
argmaxxW(x, v, w).
The reason the utility above is called “latent” is, as is shortly discussed, in the presence of implicit
bias, the perceived utility may be different from the latent utility. Note that subset selection is a
special case of the ranking problem when vj = 1 for all j ∈ [n].
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2.2 Groups and a model for implicit bias
Items may belong to one or more of intersectional (i.e., not necessarily disjoint) groupsG1, G2, . . . , Gp.
Each Gs ⊆ [m] and Gs∩Gt may not be empty for s 6= t. The perceived or observed utility of group
items in Gs may be different from their latent utility. And, items that belong to multiple groups
may be subject to multiple implicit biases, as has been observed [7, 52]. To mathematically model
this, we consider a model of implicit bias introduced by by [34], which is motivated from empirical
findings of [57]: For two disjoint groups, Ga, Gb ⊆ [m], given an implicit bias parameter β ∈ [0, 1]
they defined the observed utility as
wˆi :=
{
wi if i ∈ Ga
βwi if i ∈ Gb.
(Observed utility, 2)
To extend this model to the case of multiple intersectional groups, for each s ∈ [p], we assume an
implicit bias parameter βs ∈ [0, 1]. Since, it is natural to expect that items at the intersection of
multiple groups encounter a higher bias [59], we define their implicit bias parameter as the product
of the implicit biases of each group the item belongs to. Formally, the observed utility wˆi of item
i ∈ [m] is
wˆi :=
( ∏
s∈[p] : Gs3i
βs
)
· wi. (3)
It follows that the case of two disjoint groups Ga, Gb is a special case; let βa = 1 and βb = β.
2.3 Intervention constraints
In the presence of implicit bias, the ranking problem then results in finding the assignment matrix
x that maximizes the observed utilityW(x, v, wˆ). Thus, not only does it result in adverse outcomes
for groups for which βs < 1, it also follows that optimizing this utility as such may be sub-optimal
for the overall goal of finding a utility maximizing rank. To see this note that if x? is the assignment
that maximizesW(x, v, wˆ), the value of the latent utility,W(x?, v, w), derived from it may be much
less.
Motivated by the Rooney Rule and its efficacy as an intervention in the subset selection problem
[34], we investigate if there are constraints that can be added to the optimization problem of finding
a ranking that maximizes the observed utilities, that results in a ranking in which the latent utility
is much higher, possibly even optimal: maxxW(x, v, w). As a class of potential interventions, we
consider lower bound constraints on the number of items from a particular group s ∈ [p], selected
in the top-k positions of the ranking, for all positions k ∈ [n]. More specifically, given L ∈ Zn×p≥0 we
consider the following constraints on rankings (assignments):
∀ k ∈ [n], s ∈ [p] Lks ≤
∑
j∈[k]
∑
i∈Gs
xij . (4)
We will sometimes refer to these constraints as L-constraints. Let
K(L) := {x ∈ {0, 1}m×n | x satisfies L-constraints} (5)
be the set of all rankings satisfying the L-constraint. Our goal will be to consider various L-
constraints and understand under what conditions on the input utilities and bias parameters does
the ranking
x˜ := argmaxx∈K(L)W(x, v, wˆ) (6)
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have the property that W(x˜, v, w) close to maxxW(x, v, w).
Constraints such as (4) have been studied by a number of works on fairness, including by
several works on ranking [18, 25, 63] While these constraints can encapsulate a variety of fairness
and diversity metrics [13], their effectiveness as an intervention for implicit biases was not clear and
the utility of the rankings generated remained ill-understood prior to this work.
3 Theoretical results
Notation. Let Z be a random variable. We use Z(k:n) to represent the k-th order statistic (the
k-th largest value) from n iid draws of Z. For all a < b, define U [a, b] to be the uniform distribution
on [a, b]. More generally, for an interval I ⊆ R, let UI be the uniform distribution on I. Let
x? := argmaxxW(x, v, w) (7)
be the ranking that maximizes the latent utility.
3.1 L-constraints are sufficient to recover optimal latent utility
Our first result is structural and shows that the class of L-constraints defined above are expressive
enough to recover the optimal latent utility while optimizing observed utility constrained to certain
specific L ∈ Zn×p≥0 .
Theorem 3.1. Given a set of latent utilities {wi}mi=1, there exists constraints L(w) ∈ Zn×p≥0 , such
that, for all implicit bias parameters {βs}ps=1 ∈ (0, 1)p, the optimal constrained ranking x˜ :=
argmaxx∈K(L(w))W(x, v, wˆ) satisfies
W(x˜, v, w) = maxxW(x, v, w). (8)
Without additional assumptions, L(w) necessarily depends on w; see Fact 8.16. A set of utility-
independent constraints is often preferable due to its simplicity and interpretability; our next two
results take steps in this direction by making assumptions about distributions from which the
utilities are drawn.
Proof sketch of Theorem 3.1. Consider the following constraints: For all s ∈ [p] and k ∈ [n],
Lks(w) :=
∑
i∈Gs,j∈[k]
x?ij .
Recall that x? := argmaxxW(x, v, w) is a function of w. We claim that Lks(w) satisfy the claim
in the theorem. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that x˜ is the same as x? up to
the groups of items at each position. Let Ti := {s : i ∈ Gs} be the set of groups i belongs to. This
proof relies on the fact that the observed utility of an item is always smaller than its latent utility,
and that for any two items i1, i2 ∈ [m], if Ti2 ( Ti1 and wi1 = wi2 , then wˆi1 < wˆi2 . Using these
we show that for each position k ∈ [n], under the chosen L-constraints, it is optimal to greedily
place item i′ ∈ [m] that has the highest observed utility and satisfies the constraints. In the next
step, we show that x˜ has the same latent utility as x? from a contradiction. We show that if the
claim is satisfied for the first k ∈ [n] positions, then we can swap two candidates i1 and i2, such
that Ti1 = Ti2 , to satisfy the claim for the first (k+ 1) positions without loosing latent utility. Here
we use the fact for any two items i1, i2 ∈ [m], if Ti2 = Ti1 and wi1 < wi2 , then wˆi1 < wˆi2 , i.e., the
relative order of items in the same set of groups does not change whether we rank them by their
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observed utility (as in x˜) or their latent utility (as in x?).2 The proof of Theorem 3.1 is presented
in Section 8.1.
3.2 Distribution independent constraints
We now study the problem of coming up with constraints that do not depend on the utilities.
Towards this, we consider the setting of two disjoint groups, Ga, Gb ⊆ [m]. Let ma := |Ga| and
mb := |Gb| be the sizes of Ga and Gb. We assume that the latent utility Wi for all items i ∈ Ga∪Gb
is i.i.d. and drawn from some distribution D. This model is equivalent to the one considered by [34],
except that they fix D to be in the family of power-law distributions, whereas our result in this
section holds for any distribution D.
The optimal ranking will sort the utilities (wi)i∈[m] in a decreasing order (breaking ties arbi-
trarily if necessary). For all ` ∈ [mb], let P` ∈ [m] be the random variable representing the position
of the `-th item from Gb in the optimal ranking. Let Nkb be the random variable that counts the
number of items belonging to Gb in the first k positions of the optimal ranking. The following
result reveals the structure of the optimal ranking (when there is no implicit bias) and is used in
the next subsection to design utility-independent constraints.
Theorem 3.2. Let D be a continuous distribution, ` ≤ mb, and 0 < k < min(ma,mb) be a
position, then
∀ δ ≥ 2 Pr[ Nkb ≤ E[Nkb]− δ ] ≤ e−
2(δ2−1)
k , (9)
E[Nkb] = k · mb/(ma+mb), (10)
E[P`] = ` ·
(
1 + ma/(mb+1)
)
. (11)
Note that this result is independent of the distribution D and only requires D to be a continuous
probability distribution. The above equations show that with high probability the optimal ranking
has k · mb/(ma+mb) items from Gb in the top-k positions, and in expectation, it places these items
at equal distances in the first k positions for all k ∈ [n]. This observation motivates the following
simple constraints.
Simple constraints. Given a number α ∈ [0, 1], we define the constraints L(α) as follows: For all
k ∈ [n]
Lka := 0 and Lkb := αk. (Rooney Rule like constraints, 12)
Note that the only non-trivial constraint is on Gb. These constraints are easy to interpret and can
be seen as generalization of the Rooney Rule to the ranking setting.
Proof sketch of Theorem 3.2. Here, we discuss the distributional independence of Theorem 3.2,
and present its proof in Section 8.2. For all i ∈ [m], wi d= D be the random utility of the i-th item
drawn from D and FD(·) be the cumulative distribution function of D. Then the independence
follows from the straightforward facts that for all D, FD(wi) d∼ U [0, 1] (here is one place it is used
that D is continuous) and that FD(·) (being a cdf) is a monotone function. From these it follows
that argmaxxW(x, v, {wi}mi=1) = argmaxxW(x, v, {FD(wi)}mi=1). Thus, we can replace the all Wis
by FD(wi) without changing the optimal ranking.
2A minor technicality is that x˜ could swap two items i1, i2 ∈ [m], with Ti2 = Ti1 and wi1 = wi2 , relative to x?.
But this does neither affects the latent utility nor the observed utility.
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3.3 Optimal latent utility from simple constraints for uniform distributions
In this section we study the effect of the simple constraints mentioned in the previous subsection
when D is the uniform distribution on [0, 1], for the setting of two disjoint groups Ga, Gb ⊆ [m]
with βa = 1 and βb = β.
We discuss how these arguments could be extended to other bounded distributions in the
remarks following Theorem 3.3, and empirically study the increase in utility for a non-bounded
distribution in Section 4.
Define the expected utility UD,v(α, β) as
UD,v(α, β) := E
w←Dm
[W(x˜, v, w)] (13)
where for each draw w, x˜ := argmaxx∈K(L(α))W(x, v, wˆ), and wˆi = wi if i ∈ Ga and wˆi = βwi if
i ∈ Gb. Sometimes we drop the subscripts D and v if they are clear from the context.
Theorem 3.3. Given a β ∈ (0, 1), if D :=U [0, 1], v satisfies Assumptions (14) and (15) with ε > 0,
and n ≤ min(ma,mb), then for α? := mbma+mb , then adding L(α)-constraints achieve nearly optimal
latent utility in expectation:
UD,v(α?, β) = UD,v(0, 1) · (1−O(n−ε/2 + n−1)).
Assumptions. ∑n−1
k=1 vk − vk+1∑n
k=1 vk
=
v1 − vn∑n
k=1 vk
= O(n−ε) (14)
∀ k ∈ [n], vk − vk+1 ≥ vk+1 − vk+2. (15)
Roughly, these assumptions mean that the position discounts be much larger than the difference
between between the discounts of two consecutive positions. These are mild assumptions, and are
satisfied by several commonly studied position discounts including DCG for ε = 0.99¯, and inverse
polynomial discount where vk := k
−c and c ∈ (0, 1) [56] for ε = 1− c.
A few remarks are in order:
1. When vk = 1 for all k ∈ [n] then we can derive the following explicit expressions of the utility
assuming ma,mb ≥ n:
UD,1(α?, β) = n
(
1− n
2(ma +mb)
+O
(
n−3/8
))
, (Utility with constraints, 16)
UD,1(0, β) =

ma(1−β2)
2 +
maβ2+mb
2
[
1− (ma+mb−n)2
(maβ+mb)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
, c = n− ω(n5/8)
n
(
1− n2ma +O
(
n−3/8
))
, c ≥ n+ Θ(n5/8).
(Utility without constraints, 17)
Where, we define c := ma(1− β).
2. Choosing β = 1 in Equation (17) we can see that the optimal latent utility from a ranking of n
items is n(1−n/(2ma+2mb)+o(1)), and that the constraints achieve this utility within a (1−Θ(n−1))
multiplicative factor for any β ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for all 0 < β < 1 there exists an n0 ∈ N such
that for all n ≥ n0, the constraints achieve nearly optimal latent utility.
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Remark 3.4. We note that our choice of α? := mbma+mb is independent of β. Thus, we can achieve
near optimal latent utility without the knowledge of β.
3. Extending D to U [0, C], does not change the form of the theorem. We can simply scale Equa-
tions (16) and (17) by C.
4. In the special case of subset selection (vk = 1 for all k), this theorem answers the open problem
in [34] regarding the `-th order Rooney rule for the uniform distribution.
Proof sketch of Theorem 3.3. To calculate UD,v(0, β), we partition the items from Ga into those with
a “high” utility (in (β, 1]) and all others (with utility in [0, β]). Items with a high utility are always
selected before any item from Gb. The number of such items, Na1 , is a sum n random variables
indicating if the utility is in [β, 1). Therefore, Na1 has a binomial distribution Binomial(n, 1− β).
Conditioned on Na1 , we can show that the distribution of observed utilities of all remaining items,
including those from Gb, is the same. This uses the fact that a uniform random variable conditioned
to lie in an sub-interval is uniform. Using this symmetry we can show that the number of items
selected from Gb, Nb, follows a hypergeometric distribution conditioned on Na1 .
This gives us a value for UD,v(0, β) conditioned on Na1 . To do away with the conditioning, we
derive approximations to the negative moments of the binomial distribution.
To upperbound the difference UD,v(0, 1) − UD,v(α?, β), we use a coupling argument and the
concentration properties of the hypergeometric distribution to show that the difference in positions
of any item i between the constrained and the unconstrained ranking is o(nδ) with high probability.
Using Assumptions (14) and (15) with the boundedness of the utility gives us a lower bound of
UD,v(0, 1)− UD,v(α?, β) = O(nδ−ε + n−1)
∑n
k=1
vk.
Further, using the fact that UD,v(0, 1) = Ω(
∑n
k=1 vk), the theorem follows by choosing δ = ε/2.
To find an explicit expression of UD,v(α, β) in the special case when vk = 1, we use a coupling
argument to show that if the unconstrained ranking picks fewer than n/2 items from Gb then the
constrained selects exactly n/2 items from both Ga and Gb. Using the distribution of Nb for the
unconstrained case we can show that this occurs with high probability as long as β < 1 (note the
strict inequality). Then, using the boundedness of the utility, we show that UD,v(α?, β) is twice the
sum of expected utility of the highest n/2 order statistics in n draws from U [0, 1] which gives us the
required expression. The proof of Theorem 3.3 in presented in Section 8.3 of the supplementary
material.
Remark 3.5. We expect similar strategy would give us bounds on UD,v(0, β) and UD,v(α?, β) with
other bounded distributions as well. We provide some evidence in favor of this for a naturally
occurring bounded distribution in Section 4. However, when D is an unbounded distribution we
cannot ignore events with a low probability and other techniques might be required to estimate the
utilities. On a positive note, we still observe an increase in utility for the (unbounded) log-normal
distribution in our empirical study (Section 4).
4 Empirical observations
We examine the effect of our constraints on naturally occurring distributions of utilities derived
from scores in the IIT-JEE 2009 dataset.3 We consider with two disjoint groups of candidates Ga
3We observe similar results from the citation dataset from the Semantic Scholar Open Research Corpus, which we
present in Section 7.2.
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and Gb, representing male and female candidates respectively.
4 First, we analyze the distributions
of the scores, Da and Db, attained by Ga and Gb, and note that that the distributions of utilities
of two groups are very similar in Section 4.1.1. In Section 4.2 we consider the situation in which
these scores accurately capture a candidate’s latent utility;5 yet implicit bias against candidates in
Gb, say during a job interview, affects the interpretation of the the score of these candidates. We
simulate this implicit bias by shading the distribution of utilities for candidates in Gb by a constant
multiplicative factor β ∈ (0, 1]. We then measure the effectiveness of our constraints by comparing
the latent utilities of:
1. Cons: Our proposed ranking, which uses constraints to correct for implicit bias.
2. Uncons: An unconstrained ranking.
3. Opt: The optimal (unattainable) ranking that maximizes the (unobserved, due to implicit bias)
utilities.
In Section 4.3, we consider the situation in which the scores themselves encode systematic biases,
and consider the effectiveness of our constrained ranking as a potential intervention. In particular,
we contrast our approach with a recent intervention used in IIT admissions, Supernumerary,
which was created to increase the representation of women at IITs [5].
4.1 Dataset: JEE scores
Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) are a group of 23 institutes of higher-education, which are,
arguably, the most prestigious engineering schools in India.6 Currently, undergraduate admissions
into the IITs are decided solely on the basis of the scores attained in the Joint Entrance Exam (JEE
Advanced; known as IIT-JEE in 2009). IIT-JEE is conducted once every year, and only students
that have graduated from high school in the previous two years are eligible. Out of the 468, 280,
candidates who took IIT-JEE in 2011, only 9627 candidates (2%) were admitted to an IIT. In the
same year, 108, 653 women (23.2% of the total) appeared in the exam, yet only 926 were admitted
into an IIT (less than 10% of the 9627 admitted) [32].
Figure 1: Distributions of scores in IIT-JEE 2009: Distribution of total scores of all male and all
female candidates. Men and women have similar distributions of total scores, with a total variation
distance of ∆TV(Da,Db) = 0.074.
4While there could be richer and non-binary gender categories, the above datasets code all of their entries as either
male or female.
5This may not be the case as examined further in Section 4.3
6The number of IITs in 2009, the year the dataset is from, was 15.
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The dataset consists of scores of candidates from IIT-JEE 2009 which was released in response
to a Right to Information application filed in June 2009 [36]. This dataset contains the scores of
384,977 students in each of the Math, Physics, and Chemistry sections of IIT-JEE 2009, along with
the student’s gender, given as a binary label (98,028 women and 286,942 men), their birth category
(see [5]), and zip code. The candidates are scored on a scale from −35 to 160 points in all three
sections, with an average total score of 28.36, a maximum score of 424 and a minimum score of
−86. While the statistics of IIT JEE 2009 admissions are not available, if roughly the same number
of students were admitted in 2009 as in 2011, then students with a score above 170 would have
been admitted.
4.1.1 Distribution of scores across groups
We found that the Johnson’s SU -distribution gave a good fit for the distribution of scores. These
fitted distributions of scores of women and men, Db and Da, are depicted in Figure 1. The two
distributions are very similar; their total-variation distance is ∆TV(Da,Db) = 0.074, i.e., the two
distributions differ on less than 8% of their probability mass. However, the mean of men µˆa =
30.79 (standard deviation σˆa = 51.80) is considerably higher than the mean of women µˆb = 21.24
(standard deviation σˆa = 39.27).
4.2 Effectiveness of constraints
We now evaluate the effectiveness of the constraints as an intervention for implicit bias (see Sec-
tion 2.2). For this evaluation, we assume that the JEE scores represent the true latent utility of a
candidate, and we assume these scores are distributed for male and female students according to
the fitted distributions Da and Db respectively. We then consider the case where k students, ma
from group Ga and mb from group Gb apply to a job where the hiring manager has implicit bias β
against group Gb. Here, Uncons would rank the candidates according to the biased utilities, Opt
would rank the candidates according to their latent utilities (which is apriori impossible due to
the implicit bias), and the proposed solution Cons would provide the optimal constrained ranking
satisfying constraint parameter α using the fast-greedy algorithm described in [18]. More formally,
the rankings are
Uncons := argmaxxW(x, v, wˆ),
Cons := argmaxx∈K(L(α))W(x, v, wˆ),
Opt := argmaxxW(x, v, w).
We report the average latent utilities UD,v(α, β), UD,v(0, β), and UD,v(0, 1) obtained by Cons,
Uncons, and Opt respectively (see Equation (13) for the definition of UD,v(·, ·)).
4.2.1 Parameters
We let m = ma + mb := 1000, k := 100, vk := 1/log(k+1) and vary the implicit bias parameter
β ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 1} and mb ∈ {m/2,m/3,m/4}. In the JEE dataset, mb ≈ m/4 is a representative
number. The position discount, vk = 1/log(k+1) corresponds to DCG [31, 33, 56] which is popularly
used in practice. We vary α from 0 to 0.5, i.e., from no constraint to the case where half of the
candidates in the ranking must be from group Gb. We report the average latent utilities UD,v(α, β),
UD,v(0, β), and UD,v(0, 1); we take the average over 5000 trials in Table 1.
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Table 1: Empirical results on IIT-JEE 2009 dataset (with DCG): We plot the latent utilities,
UD,v(α, β), UD,v(0, β), and UD,v(0, 1) obtained by Cons, Uncons and Opt respectively (see Equa-
tion (13) for the definition of UD,v(·, ·)); we average over values over 5 · 103 trials. Each plot
represents an instance of the problem for a given value of implicit bias parameter β and the ratio
of the size, mb, of the underprivileged group, to the size ma, of the privileged group. The bar
represents the optimal constraint α: where we require the ranking to place at least kα candidates
in the top k positions of the ranking for every position k. We note that our constraints attain close
to the optimal latent utility for the right choice of α. More notably, they significantly outperform
the unconstrained setting for a wide range of α, lending robustness to the approach. Even when
there is no observed bias (β = 1), adding constraints does not appear to significantly impact the
utility of the ranking unless the constraints are very strong.
4.2.2 Results
We observe that the constraint intervention can significantly increase the latent utility of the
ranking, even when, Da and Db are non-uniform, and are not exactly the same. The extent of the
improvement depends both on the degree of implicit bias β, and the fraction of the underrepresented
group ma/m that appears in the dataset. As expected from Theorem 3.3, there exists an α for
which the latent utility from the optimal ranking can be attained. More generally, we observe that
the constraints increase the latent utility when α is such that it ensures no more than proportional
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representation – i.e., when the constraint ensures that the ranking reflects the group percentages
in the underlying population, even when the bias parameter is small.
We conduct similar simulations without a discounting factor – i.e., with just selection with no
ranking, and observe similar results in Section 7.1. We also observe similar results on the Semantic
Scholar Research Corpus, where the distributions are heavy tailed and hence constitute a very
different class of utilities (see Section 7.2). Overall, these findings suggest that the intervention
is robust and across different latent utility distributions, population sizes, and extent of bias, and
that the exact parameters need not be known to develop successful interventions.
4.3 IIT supernumerary seats for women
If we assume that the scores of the candidates are a true measure of their academic “potential”,
then any scheme which increases the number of underrepresented candidates admitted is bound to
decrease the average “potential” of candidates at the institute. However, among candidates of equal
“potential”, those from an underprivileged group are known to perform poorer on standardized
tests [55]. In India, fewer girls than boys attend primary school [3,40], many of whom are forced to
drop-out of schools to help with work at home or get married [60]. Therefore, we expect a female
student who has the same score as a male student, say in IIT-JEE, to perform better than the boy
if admitted. This is a societal bias, which, while different in nature than implicit bias, is another
reason through which utilities can be systematically wrong against a particular group. Hence, the
constraint approach presented is equally applicable as we illustrate in this section. In effect, it
means that the scores are in fact biased, and the true latent utility of a candidate from Gb is in
fact larger than what is reflected from their score.
To account for this and improve the representation of women in IITs, in 2018, additional
“supernumerary” seats for women were introduced. This increases the capacity of all majors in
all IITs by creating additional seats which are reserved for women, such that women compose at
least 14% of each major, without decreasing the number of non-female candidates admitted. More
formally, if the original capacity of a major at an IIT was C, and the average number of females
admitted in this major in the past few years was nf , then the scheme created x additional seats such
that nf + x := 0.14(C + x). Where (nf + x) seats are reserved for females and the other (C − nf )
seats are open to candidates of all genders. Eligible women are granted admission on reserved seat
first, and only when all reserved seats are filled a women admitted on a gender neutral seat [5].
4.3.1 Setup
We assume the number of slots available in a given year for the IITs is n := 104.7 We assume that
the true latent utility of a candidate from group Gb is given by a shift γ > 1, such that if they
attain a score sf , then a true score would be s
′
f := (sf + 105) · γ − 105.8 In our simulations, we use
γ ≈ 1.076, which results in a shifted distribution D′b with the same mean as Da.
Let the supernumerary scheme, Sup(α), admit nSup(α) ≥ n candidates. We know that Sup
always admits more candidates than our constraints approach, Cons(α), and the unconstrained
approach Uncons, both of which choose n candidates. As such, it would be unfair to compare
the average utility of the candidate selected by Sup with that of Cons(α) or Uncons. We define
two more rankings Cons(α) and Uncons, which given an α select nSup(α) candidates and are
otherwise equivalent to Cons(α) and Uncons.
7This number is close to the 9311 and 9576 students admitted into IITs in 2011 and 2012 which had the number
of IITs as 2009.
8The shifts by 105 are to account fo the score range which can be negative.
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We allocate n seats using the simple constraints scheme, Cons and Uncons and nSup(α) ≥
n seats using Sup(α), Cons(α), and Uncons. and compare the average latent utilities of the
candidates admitted by the scheme. Here, we define the average latent utility from scheme A
which admits n(A) candidates as
U(A) :=
1
n(A)
· Ew←Da,D′b [W(x˜, v, w)]
where x˜ := max
x satisfies A
W(x˜, v, wˆ).
We vary α from 0.1 to 0.25, i.e., from the fraction of women admitted if all candidates are admitted
on basis of their scores, to the value which corresponds to proportional the representation based
on the number of candidates appearing in IIT-JEE 2009. We report the average latent utilities in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Empirical results studying the effect of supernumerary seats for women: We plot the
average latent utilities of the ranking schemes we consider. The y-axis represents the utility per
candidate, and the x-axis represents the lower-bound constraint α. Our constrained interventions
outperform the unconstrained variants up to approximately 20% female seats, and always outper-
forms the existing supernumerary approach used in practice.
4.3.2 Results
We observe that the Sup(α) always has an lower average utility that Cons(α) scheme. We note
that the Sup(α) and the Cons(α) always select the same number of candidates. The difference
is that Sup(α) could place all the underprivileged candidates at the end of the ranking, while
Cons(α) places at least k · α underprivileged candidates every k positions.
We find that for any α > 0.1, Sup(α) decreases the average latent utility of the admitted
candidates.
Finally, we observe that for a range of α (from 11% to 19.4%), Cons increases the average
latent utility of the admitted candidates over Uncons and Cons(α) increases the latent utility
over Uncons, i.e., for all α ∈ [0.11, 0.194],
1/n · U(Cons(α)) > 1/n · U(Uncons),
1/nSup(α) · U(Cons(α)) > 1/n · U(Uncons).
The optimal constraint for Cons(α) is argmaxα U(Cons(α)) = 0.15. Intuitively, Cons(α) can
increase the average utility by swapping a male candidate i ∈ Ga and female candidate j ∈ Gb, such
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that wˆj < wi < wj . Note that in Cons(α) additional candidates selected from Gb compete against
the lowest scoring candidates from Gb in the ranking, instead of the average utility U(Cons(α)) as
in Sup(α).
Remark 4.1. Since Sup(α) was not designed to optimize the average utility, it is not surprising
that Cons(α) outperforms Sup(α) in our experiment. However, the goal of this experiment is to
study the effect our constraints approach against systematic biases different from implicit bias, by
qualitatively comparing them an existing scheme (Sup(α)).
5 Discussion and limitations
One could also consider other approaches to mitigate implicit bias. For instance, in a setting where
an interviewer ranks the candidates, we could ask interviewers to self-correct (rescale) their implicit
bias. However, anti-bias training, which aims to correct peoples’ implicit bias, has been shown to
have limited efficacy [44]. Thus, even with training, we do not have a guarantee that the interviewer
can self-correct effectively. Adding interventions like the ones we consider do not require individuals
to self-correct their perceptions.
Instead, we could ask interviewers to report their observed utilities and later rescale them. How-
ever, we may not have an accurate estimate of β. As the interventions we consider are independent
of β (in Theorem 3.3), they can be applied in such a setting and would still recover the optimal
utility (see Remark 3.4). Furthermore, if interviewers are explicitly biased, they can give arbitrarily
low scores to one group of candidates; this would make any rescaling attempt insufficient. By
instead requiring a fixed number of candidates from each group, the interventions we consider are
also robust against explicit bias, and perhaps this is why simple versions have been used in practice
(e.g., Rooney rule [11,50]).
We crucially note that any such intervention will only have a positive end effect if the goal is
sincere; a hiring manager who is biased against a group of people can simply not hire a person from
that group, regardless of what ranking they are given or what representation is enforced throughout
the interview process. Furthermore, while interventions such as the ones we describe here are a
robust approach to correct for certain kinds of biases, they are only a single step in the process
and alone cannot suffice. It would be important to evaluate this approach as part of the larger
ecosystem in which it is used in order to adequately measure its efficacy in practice.
6 Conclusion and future directions
We consider a type of constraint-based interventions for re-ordering biased rankings derived from
utilities with systematic biases against a particular socially salient group. The goal of these inter-
ventions is to recover, to the best of our ability, the unbiased ranking that would have resulted from
the true latent (unbiased) utilities. We consider a theoretical model of implicit bias, and study the
effect of such interventions on rankings in this setting.
We show that this family of constraint-based interventions are sufficient to mitigate implicit
bias under this model; in other words, a ranking with the optimal latent utility can be recovered
using this kind of intervention. However, the optimal parameters of the intervention depend on
the specific utilities. Towards understanding this further, we make a natural assumption that the
utilities are drawn from a fixed distribution, and show that simple constraints recover the optimal
utility under this bias model. We focus on specific distributions, but believe that similar theoretical
bounds would exist for other bounded distributions as discussed in Section 3.3. Rigorously analyzing
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necessary properties of distributions for which such bounds hold would be an interesting direction
for future work.
In this work we pose the problem in terms of implicit biases. However, the source of the bias is
not important; our results hold as long as there is systematic bias against one group as captured by
our model in Section 2.2. We briefly discuss a different type of social bias in Section 4.3. Further,
we note that this class of interventions is also robust against explicit bias (see Section 5). Their
robustness is further supported by our empirical findings, in which we find that there exist optimal
constraints α? for which the optimal latent utility is almost attained in expectation. Importantly,
we find that the interventions are near-optimal even when the distributions are unbounded (e.g.,
lognormal distributions; see Section 7.2). Further, the interventions remain near-optimal even when
the latent utility distribution of the underprivileged group is similar, but not identical, to that of
the privileged group (see Section 4.2). More generally, we observe that the intervention improves
the latent utility of the ranking for a wide range of α, with the highest improvement roughly
centered around proportional representation. This gives an interesting rule of thumb, but more
importantly shows the robustness of the method; without knowing the exact optimal α, one can
still improve the ranking’s latent utility significantly. From these observations, we expect this class
of constraint-based intervention to be successful for a wide class of settings; exploring its limitations
and developing clear guidelines on when and how to use the interventions in a particular use case
would be an important avenue for further work.
Lastly, we note that while we phrase the majority of our results in light of rankings, they also
have implications for the subset selection problem (where a group must be chosen, but need not be
ordered) by taking the discounting factor vk = 1 for all positions k ∈ [n]. This, in effect, eliminates
the importance of the order and the total utility depends only on the set of people or items selected.
In particular, our results answers a question asked in [34] on the efficacy of the `-th order Rooney
Rule when the distribution of utilities is uniform. We further report empirical results for subset
selection, which follow the setup and conclusions discussed in Section 7.1.
In summary, simple constraint-based interventions appear to be highly effective and robust for
a wide variety of biases, distributions and settings; it is our hope that they be adopted and studied
further as a simple yet powerful tool to help combat biases in a variety of applications.
7 Extended empirical results
7.1 Additional results with JEE scores
We present our empirical results for the IIT-JEE dataset without position-discount as described
in Section 4.2 in Table 2.
7.2 Empirical results with the Semantic Scholar Open Research Corpus
7.2.1 Dataset
The Semantic Scholar Open Research Corpus contains meta-data of 46,947,044 published research
papers in Computer Science, Neuroscience, and Bio-medicine from 1936 to 2019 on Semantic
Scholar. The meta-data for each paper includes the list of authors of the paper, the year of
publication, list of papers citing it, and journal of publication, along with other details.
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Figure 3: Statistics from the Semantic Scholar Open Research Corpus.
7.2.2 Cleaning dataset and predicting author gender
While counting the total citations we remove all papers which did not have the year of publishing,
this retains 98.14% of all the papers. The Semantic Scholar dataset did not contain the author’s
gender, which we predict from their first name using a publicly available dataset from the the
US Social Security Administration [2]. We predict an author’s gender from their first name using
a publicly available dataset of names from the the US Social Security Administration [2]. This
dataset contains first names and gender of all people born from 1890 to 2018 registered with the
social security administration. We first remove all the authors whose first name is shorter than 2
characters, as these are likely to be abbreviations. This retains more that 75% of the 17,805,885
unique authors. Then, we categorize an author as female if more than 90% people with the same
first name were females, and as a male if more than 90% people with the same first name were
males, otherwise we drop the author. This retains 67.75% of the remaining authors, and results
in 3900934 women and 5074426 men (43.46% females). We plot the trade off between the total
authors retained and the threshold used while categorizing in Figure 3(a).
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7.2.3 Counting the total citations
We approximate the distribution of total citations of men and women, who published their first
paper after 1980. This removes less than 5% of the authors. We present the distribution of Total
Citations of men and women in Figure 3(c). We found that the log-normal distribution gave a good
fit for the distribution of total citations.
7.2.4 Parameters
We let m = ma+mb := 1000, k := 100, vk = 1 and vary the implicit bias parameter β ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 1}
and mb ∈ {m/2,m/3,m/4}. We vary α from 0 to 0.5, i.e., from no constraint to the case where half
of the candidates in the ranking must be from group Gb. We report the average latent utilities
UD,v(α, β), UD,v(0, β), and UD,v(0, 1); we take the average over 5000 trials in Table 3.
7.2.5 Results
We observe similar results as with the JEE scores dataset. We refer the reader to Section 4.2.2 for
a discussion of our observations.
8 Proofs
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 8.1. (Restatement of Theorem 3.1). Given a set of latent utilities {wi}mi=1, there
exists constraints L(w) ∈ Zn×p≥0 , such that, for all implicit bias parameters {βs}ps=1 ∈ (0, 1)p, the
optimal constrained ranking x˜ := argmaxx∈K(L(w))W(x, v, wˆ) satisfies
W(x˜, v, w) = maxxW(x, v, w). (18)
Proof. Let pi : [m]→ [n+ 1] be the observed utility maximizing ranking and pi? : [m]→ [n+ 1], be
the optimal latent utility maximizing ranking, where we define pi(i) := n+ 1 and pi?(i) := n+ 1, if
item i was not ranked in the first n positions of pi or pi?. We claim that the following constraints
are suitable for Theorem 3.1: For all s ∈ [p] and k ∈ [n]:
Lks :=
∑
t∈Gs : pi?(t)≤k
1. (19)
We will prove that under these constraints, pi and pi? are the same up to the groups of the items
ranked at each position. The following lemma shows that they also have the same latent utility.
Lemma 8.2. If for all k ∈ [n], Tik = Ti?k where ik, i?k are such that ik = pi−1(k) and i?k = (pi?)−1(k),
i.e., pi and pi? are the same up to the groups of the items ranked at each position, then pi and pi?
have the same latent utility.
Proof. We show that the relative order of all items with different latent utilities is the same between
the two rankings, proving that they have the same latent utility. Consider two items i1 and i2 in
the same set of groups, i.e., such that Ti1 = Ti2 . We note that swapping their positions does not
violate any new constraints. Further since, i1 and i2 have the same implicit bias, we have(
Ti1 = Ti2 and wi1 > wi2
)
=⇒ wˆi1 > wˆi2 . (20)
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Table 2: Empirical results on IIT-JEE 2009 dataset (without DCG): We plot the latent utilities,
UD,v(α, β), UD,v(0, β), and UD,v(0, 1) obtained by Cons, Uncons and Opt respectively (see Equa-
tion (13) for the definition of UD,v(·, ·)); we average over values over 5 · 103 trials. Each plot
represents an instance of the problem for a given value of implicit bias parameter β and the ratio
of the size, mb, of the underprivileged group, to the size ma, of the privileged group. The bar
represents the optimal constraint α: where we require the ranking to place at least kα candidates
in the top k positions of the ranking for every position k.
Towards a contradiction, assume that pi and pi? have different relative order of i1 and i2. Without
loss of generality let pi?(i1) < pi
?(i2) and pi(i1) > pi(i2). Since pi
? is optimal we have wi1 ≥ wi2 . If
wi1 = wi2 , then these items do not change the latent utility between pi
? and pi. Let wi1 < wi2 , from
Equation (20) we have that wˆi1 < wˆi2 . Therefore, we can swap the positions of i1 and i2 in pi to
gain the following observed utility
wˆi1vpi(i2) + wˆi2vpi(i1) − wˆi1vpi(i1) − wˆi2vpi(i2) =
(
wˆi2 − wˆi1
) · (vpi(i1) − vpi(i2)) > 0.
This contradicts the fact that pi has the optimal observed utility.
It remains to prove that with these constraints, pi is the same as pi? up to the groups of the
items. This proof is by induction.
Inductive hypothesis: Let the two rankings agree on the first (k − 1) positions (up to the groups
of the item ranked at each position).
20
mb/m = 1/4 mb/m = 1/3 mb/m = 1/2
β
=
1
..
..
..
..
β
=
1 /
2
..
..
..
..
β
=
1 /
4
..
..
..
..
Table 3: Empirical results on distributions of utilities from the Semantic Scholar Open Research
Corpus (without DCG): We plot the latent utilities, UD,v(α, β), UD,v(0, β), and UD,v(0, 1) obtained
by Cons, Uncons and Opt respectively (see Equation (13) for the definition of UD,v(·, ·)); we
average over values over 5 · 103 trials. Each plot represents an instance of the problem for a given
value of implicit bias parameter β and the ratio of the size, mb, of the underprivileged group, to
the size ma, of the privileged group.
Base case: The base case for k = 1 is trivially satisfied.
Towards, a contradiction assume that the items on the k-th positions of pi and pi? are i and i? ∈ [m],
such that Ti 6= Ti? . Since pi? ranks i after i? it follows that
wi ≤ wi? . (21)
Case A: Ti ( Ti? : We claim that this case is not possible. Consider any group Gs, for s ∈ Ti?\Ti.
Since the rankings agree on the first (k − 1) positions we have for all j ∈ [k − 1]∑
t∈Gs : pi(t)≤j
1 =
∑
t∈Gs : pi?(t)≤j
1. (22)
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Since pi(i) = k we have∑
t∈Gs : pi(t)≤k
1 =
∑
t∈Gs : pi(t)<k
1 + I[i ∈ Gs]
(22)
=
∑
t∈Gs : pi?(t)<k
1 + I[i ∈ Gs]
<
∑
t∈Gs : pi?(t)<k
1 + I[i ∈ Gs] + I[i? ∈ Gs] (Using i? ∈ Gs)
=
∑
t∈Gs : pi?(t)≤k
1 + I[i ∈ Gs]
=
∑
t∈Gs : pi?(t)≤k
1
(19)
= Lks. (Using i 6∈ Gs)
Therefore, in this case pi violates the constraint at position k.
Case B: Ti ) Ti?: In this case we have
wˆi :=
(∏
s∈[p] : Gs3i
βs
)
· wi =
(∏
s∈[p] β
I[i∈Gs]
s
)
wi
=
( ∏
s∈[p]
βI[i
?∈Gs]
s
)( ∏
s∈[p]
βI[i∈Gs]·I[i
? 6∈Gs]
s
)
wi (Using Ti ) Ti?)
<
(∏
s∈[p] β
I[i?∈Gs]
s
)
· wi (For all s ∈ [p], βs ∈ (0, 1))
(21)
<
(∏
s∈[p] β
I[i?∈Gs]
s
)
· wi?
< wˆi? . (23)
Consider the ranking pˆi formed by swapping the position of i and i? in pi. The change in observed
utility between pˆi and pi is
wˆivpi(i?) + wˆi?vpi(i) − wˆivpi(i) − wˆi?vpi(i?) =
(
wˆi? − wˆi
) · (vpi(i) − vpi(i?)) (23)> 0.
Therefore, pˆi has higher observed utility than pi. Therefore, if pˆi satisfies the constraints, then this
contradicts the optimality of pi, and we are done. pˆi can only violate the constraints in positions
j ∈ [k, . . . , pi(i?)] for groups Ti\Ti? . Since the number of items selected from the set of groups
Ti\Ti? only increases. It follows that if pi satisfies the lower bound constraints on positions j ∈
[k, . . . , pi(i?)], then so does pˆi. Since we assume pi to be feasible, we are done.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Theorem 8.3. (Restatement of Theorem 3.2). Let D be a continuous distribution, ` ≤ mb,
and 0 < k < min(ma,mb) be a position, then
∀ δ ≥ 2 Pr[ Nkb ≤ E[Nkb]− δ ] ≤ e−
(2δ2−1)
k , (24)
E[Nkb] = k · mb/(ma+mb), (25)
E[P`] = ` ·
(
1 + ma/(mb+1)
)
. (26)
Equivalent simple model. Since the items have the same distribution D of latent utility, the
event: i ∈ Ga (or equivalently i ∈ Gb), is independent of the event: wi = z for some z ∈ supp(D).
Therefore, the latent utility maximizing ranking is independent of the groups assigned to each item.
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It follows that the following is an equivalent model of generating the unbiased ranking: First,
we draw ma + mb latent utilities and order them in a non-increasing order (randomly breaking
ties). Then, we choose mb items uniformly without replacement and assign them to Gb, and assign
the others to Ga. Let a item i ∈ Gb be a blue ball and i ∈ Ga be a red ball, then distributions of
positions of the balls is equivalent to: Given ma+mb numbered balls, we pick mb of them uniformly
without replacement and color them blue, and color the rest of the balls red.
Proof. Using the above model, we first find that P` has a negative-hypergeometric distribution and
use it to calculate, E[P`], then we find that Nkb is a hypergeometric distribution, use this fact to
calculate E[Nkb] and show Nkb is concentrated around its mean.
Expectation of P`. The total ways of choosing mb blue balls is
(
ma+mb
mb
)
. Given P` = k, the
number of ways of choosing the ` − 1 blue balls before it is (k−1`−1) and the number of ways of
choosing the b− ` blue balls after it is (ma+mb−kb−` ). Therefore by expressing the probability as the
ratio of favorable and total outcomes we have
Pr[P` = k] =
(
k−1
`−1
)(
ma+mb−k
b−`
)(
ma+mb
mb
) . (27)
Rewriting it using the fact that
(
ma
mb
)
=
(
ma
ma−mb
)
we get
Pr[P` = k] =
(
k−1
k−`
)(
ma+mb−k
ma−b+`
)(
ma+mb
ma
) = ((k−`)+(`−1)k−` )(ma+mb−(k−`)−`ma−(x−`) )(ma+mb
ma
) .
Comparing this with the density function of the Negative hypergeometric distribution (28) it is
easy to observe that P` − ` is a negative hypergeometric variable.
Given numbers N,K, r, the negative hypergeometric random variable, NG, has the following
distribution, for all k ∈ [K]
Pr[NG = k] :=
(
k+r−1
k
)(
N−r−k
K−k
)(
N
K
) . (28)
From the expectation of a negative-hypergeometric variable we have
E[P` − `] = ` · ma
mb + 1
=⇒ E[P`] = ` · (ma +mb + 1)
mb + 1
. (29)
Expectation and Concentration of Nkb. Given Nkb = j, the number of ways of coloring j out
of k balls before it is
(
k
j
)
, and the number of ways of coloring b − j balls after it is (ma+mb−kb−` ).
Therefore it follows that:
Pr[ Nkb = j ] =
(
k
j
)(
ma+mb−k
b−j
)(
ma+mb
mb
) . (30)
Given numbers N,K, n, for an hypergeometric random variable, HG, we have: ∀max(0, n+
K −N) ≤ k ≤ min(K,n)
Pr[HG = k] :=
(
K
k
)(
N−K
n−k
)(
N
n
) . (31)
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By comparing with Equation (31), we can observe that Nkb is a hypergeometric random variable.
From well known properties of the hypergeometric distribution we have that
E[ Nkb ] =
kb
(ma +mb)
(32)
Pr [Nkb ≥ kb/(ma+mb) + δ]
[30]
≤ e−2(δ2−1)γ ≤ e− 2(δ
2−1)
k+1 (33)
Pr [Nkb ≤ kb/(ma+mb)− δ]
[30]
≤ e−2(δ2−1)γ ≤ e− 2(δ
2−1)
k+1 (34)
where γ := max
(
1
ma+1
+ 1mb+1 ,
1
k+1 +
1
ma+mb−n+1
) ≥ 1k+1 .
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We begin by restating Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 8.4. (Restatement of Theorem 3.3). Given a β ∈ (0, 1), if D := U [0, 1], v satisfies
Assumptions (14) and (15) with ε > 0, and n ≤ min(ma,mb), then for α? := mbma+mb , then adding
L(α?)-constraints achieve nearly optimal latent utility in expectation:
UD,v(α?, β) = UD,v(0, 1) · (1−O(n−ε/2 + n−1).
We present the proof of the special case where ma = mb = n. The general proof follows
from the same outline, by substituting values of ma and mb in the appropriate equations. We use
Proposition 8.6 and 8.5 in the proof of the special case. We present their analogues for the general
case in Section 8.4.4.
8.3.1 Notation
Recall that we have two groups of candidates Ga and Gb, with |Ga| := n and |Gb| := n. Gb is the
underprivileged group. The latent utility of candidates in both groups is drawn from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Let wi be the random variable representing the latent utility of a candidate
i ∈ Ga ∪ Gb. Due to implicit bias the observed utility of a candidate j ∈ Gb, wˆj is their latent
utility, wj , multiplied by β ∈ [0, 1], whereas the observed utility of a candidate i ∈ Ga is equal to
their latent utility, wi.
We consider the top ` ∈ [n] candidates in decreasing order of their observed utilities. Let S`a ⊆
Ga and S
`
b ⊆ Gb be the set of candidates selected from Ga and Gb respectively. Let S`a1 , S`a2 ⊆ S`a,
such that S`a1 ∪ S`a2 = S`a, be the set of candidates selected from Ga with utilities larger or equal
to and strictly smaller than β respectively. We define the following random variables counting the
number of candidates selected
1. N `a := |S`a|
2. N `b := |S`b |
3. N `a1 := |S`a1 |
4. N `a2 := |S`a2 |.
When considering the first n positions we drop ` from the superscripts of the variables.
Recall
x?(v, w) := argmax
x
W(x, v, w) (35)
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is the ranking that maximizes the latent utility. Further, let
xcons(α
?, v, w) := argmax
x∈K(L(α?))
W(x, v, wˆ) (36)
be the optimal constrained ranking optimizing wˆ, and
xuncons(v, w) := argmax
x
W(x, v, wˆ) (37)
be the optimal unconstrained ranking maximizing wˆ. When v and w are clear from the context we
write x?, xuncons, and when α
? is also clear we write xcons.
Let δ > 0 be some number greater than 0. We will fix δ later in the proof. Define a partition⋃n1−δ
k=1 [(k − 1)nδ + 1, knδ] of [n], into n1−δ intervals of size nδ. Let
sk := (k − 1)nδ + 1 and ek := knδ
be starting and ending index of the k-th interval.
8.3.2 Useful propositions
We use the following two propositions in the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proposition 8.5. Let N ∼ Binomial(n, 1− β), then
E
[
n
2n−N
]
=
1
1 + β
+O
(
n−3/8
)
, (38)
E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
]
=
1
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)
. (39)
Proposition 8.6. (Expected number of candidates without constraints). Given a number
β ∈ (0, 1], representing the implicit bias, we have
Na1
d
= Binomial(n, 1− β), (40)
E[Nb] = n
(
β
1 + β
+O
(
n−3/8
))
, (41)
Pr
[|Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ n5/8] = 1−O(e−n1/4). (42)
8.3.3 Proof overview
Define k := d2i/nδe. We first show that xcons places the i-th order statistics from both Ga and Gb
inside the interval [sk, ek] with high probability (see Lemma 8.8). From this, it follows that the
positions of these candidates is within ek − sk = O(nδ) positions of 2i with high probability.
We compare the product of the utility and position discount of the i-th order statistic from
Ga and from Gb in xcons, with that of the candidates in the (2i − 1)-th and 2i-th positions in
x?. We show that this difference is “small” using Assumption (15). This allows us to bound
UD,v(0, 1)− UD,v(α?, β) by
O
(
(nδ−ε + n−1) ·
n∑
k=1
vk
)
.
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A lower bound
UD,v(0, 1) = Ω
( n∑
k=1
vk
)
simply follows from the fact that for all i ∈ [n]
E[w(i : ma+mb)] ≥
1
2
which in turn follows from 2n ≤ (ma + mb). Finally, choosing δ = ε/2 and using Assumption (14)
gives us the required result.
This overview simplifies some details, for instance, we calculate the utility conditioned on the
event that the i-th order statistic of Ga and Gb are close to 2i. This event is not independent of
the utilities. In the proof, we carefully ensure that this conditioning does not alter the utilities by
“a lot”. Here, we use Proposition 8.6 and Proposition 8.5.
Remark 8.7. (Generalizing the proof). More generally, the proof proceeds by showing that
xcons places the i-th order statistic from Ga in the interval [sk, ek] for k :=
⌈
i(ma +mb)n
−δ · 1ma
⌉
,
and from Gb in the interval [sk, ek] for k :=
⌈
i(ma +mb)n
−δ · 1mb
⌉
.
8.3.4 Proof
Proof. Let Hk be the event that xcons places exactly (n
δ/2) candidates from Ga in the k-th interval,
[sk, ek], i.e., ∑
i∈Ga
∑ek
j=sk
(xcons)ij =
nδ
2
.
Define the event H as the intersection
H :=
n1−δ⋂
k=1
Hk.
Conditioned on the union H , each interval [sk, ek] in xcons contains exactly
ek−sk+1
2 candidates
from Ga and from Gb. Therefore, xcons ranks the i-th order statistic both from Ga and from Gb in
the interval [sk, ek] for k := d2i/nδe.
Let N `b be the number of candidates from Gb placed in the first ` ∈ [n] positions of xuncons. From
Proposition 8.12 we know that if N `b ≤ /`2, then the xcons places exactly /`2 candidates from Gb in
the first ` positions. Extending this observation to all 1 < k ≤ n it follows that,(
N ekb ≤ ek/2
) ∧ (N ek−1b ≤ ek−1/2) =⇒ Hk(
N e1b ≤ e1/2
)
=⇒ H1.
The first implication follows since LHS implies∑
i∈Ga,j≤ek
(xcons)ij =
ek
2
and
∑
i∈Ga,j≤ek−1
(xcons)ij =
ek−1
2
,
or equivalently ∑
i∈Ga
ek∑
j=sk
(xcons)ij =
(ek − ek−1)
2
=
(ek − sk + 1)
2
.
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Now, taking the intersection of the above events we have⋂n1−δ
k=1
(
N ekb ≤
ek
2
)
=⇒
⋂n1−δ
k=1
Hk ⇐⇒ H . (43)
Lemma 8.8. Given ma,mb ≥ n, Pr[H ] ≥ 1−O(e−Θ(n)).
Proof. To show that H occurs with high probability we calculate Pr[N `b − E[N `b ] ≤ k]. Setting
` := ek, this allows us to bound Pr
[
N ekb ≤ ek2
]
. Then Equation (43) this gives us a bound on
Pr[H ].
Following the proof of Lemma 8.6, but only considering the first ` (instead of n) positions (and
assuming ` > Na1), we can derive the following equivalents to Equations (62) and (64). If ` > Na1 ,
then
E[N `b |Na1 ] =
n(`−Na1)
2n−Na1
(44)
Pr[N `b − E[N `b ] ≤ k|Na1 ] = 1−O(e
− 2(k2−1)
`−Na1 ). (45)
These follow by substituting ` for n, whenever n does not refer to the size of the groups. The case
when ` ≤ Na1 is straightforward to analyze: Since there are more than ` candidates in Ga with high
utilities (in [β, 1]), no candidate from Gb is selected in the first ` positions, i.e., N
`
b = 0. Therefore
we have
E[N `b |Na1 ] =
{
n(`−Na1 )
2n−Na1 if ` > Na1
0 otherwise.
E[N `b |Na1 ] ≤
n(`−Na1)
2n−Na1
= n+
n(`− 2n)
2n−Na1
.
Taking the expectation of the above expression we have
E[N `b ]
Prop. 8.5
≤ n+ n(`− 2n)
2n− E[Na1 ]
· (1 +O(`−3/8))
≤ `− n(1− β)
1 + β
· (1 +O(`−3/8)).
(Using E[Na1 ] = n(1− β) from Prop. 8.6., 46)
To find the distribution of
(
N `b |Na1
)
when ` > Na1 , we can substitute n as ` in all arguments in
Section 8.3.6, specifically from Equation (64) to Equation (66). This gives us
Pr[N `b − E[N `b ] ≤ Θ(n) | Na1 , ` > Na1 ] = 1−O(e
− 2(Θ(n2)−1)
`−Na1 ).
When ` ≤ Na1 , there are more than ` candidates in Ga with high utilities in [β, 1]. Therefore,
no candidate from Gb is selected in the first ` positions, i.e., N
`
b = 0. In other words, Pr[N
`
b =
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E[N `b ] | Na1 , ` ≤ Na1 ] = 1. Following this, we have
Pr[N `b − E[N `b ] ≤ Θ(n) | Na1 ] =
1−O(e−
2(Θ(n2)−1)
`−Na1 ) if ` > Na1
1 otherwise
=
1−O(e−
2(Θ(n2)−1)
O(n) ) if ` > Na1
1 otherwise
(Using `,Na1 = O(n))
≥ 1−O(e−Θ(n)). (Using k = Θ(n).)
Since the RHS holds for all values of Na1 , we can drop the conditioning in the LHS to get
Pr[N `b − E[N `b ] ≤ Θ(n)] ≥ 1−O(e−Θ(n)). (47)
Substituting ` := ek, we can bound Pr[N
ek
b ≤ ek/2] as follows
Pr
[
N ekb ≤ ek/2
] (46)≥ Pr [N ekb − E[N ekb ] ≤ ek2 − ek − n(1− β)1 + β · (1 +O(n−3/8))
]
= Pr
[
N ekb − E[N ekb ] ≤
ek(β − 1)
2(1 + β)
· (1 +O(n−3/8))+ n(1− β)
1 + β
· (1 +O(n−3/8))]
≥ Pr
[
N ekb − E[N ekb ] ≤
n(1− β)
2(1 + β)
· (1 +O(n−3/8))] (∵ ek ≤ n)
= Pr
[
N ekb − E[N ekb ] ≤ Θ(n)
]
.
Using Equation (47) and that ek ≤ n, it follows that
Pr
[
N ekb ≤ ek/2
] ≥ 1−O(e−Θ(n))
Pr
[
N ekb >
ek/2
] ≤ O(e−Θ(n)). (48)
From Equation (43) we have
Pr
[
H
]
= Pr
[⋂n1−δ
k=1
Hk
]
= Pr
[⋂n1−δ
k=1
[
N ekb ≤ ek/2
] ]
= 1− Pr
[⋂n1−δ
k=1
[
N ekb >
ek/2
] ]
≥ 1−
n1−δ∑
k=1
Pr
[
N ekb >
ek/2
]
(48)
= 1−
n1−δ∑
k=1
O(e−Θ(n))
= 1− n1−δO(e−Θ(n))
= 1−O(e−Θ(n)+(1−δ) logn)
= 1−O(e−Θ(n)). (49)
This proves the Lemma 8.8.
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Notation. For all i ∈ Ga, let a(i) ∈ [n] denote the position of the i-th order statistic in Ga in
xcons. Similarly, for all j ∈ Gb, let b(i) ∈ [n] denote the position of the i-th order statistic in Gb
in xcons. Conditioned on H , we know that xcons selects exactly n/2 candidates from Ga and Gb
(see Propositions 8.12), and that for all i ∈ [n/2], a(i), b(i) ∈ [sk, ek] where k = d2i/nδe. Let W be
a random utility drawn from D. We use W(n−k:n) to represent the k-th order statistic from n iid
draws of W : the k-th largest value from n iid draws of W .
For all ` ∈ [n], define U`,a and U`,b as follows
U`,a :=
∑`
i=1
W(i:n)v(a(i)) and U`,b :=
∑`
i=1
W(i:n)v(b(i)).
Here U`,a represents sum of the latent utilities of the top ` candidates from Ga weighted by their
position discount. Likewise, U`,b represents sum of the latent utilities of the top ` candidates from
Gb weighted by their position discount.
From Proposition 8.12 the expected latent utility of the constrained ranking given H is
Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] = E[Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ].
However, H is not independent of Un
2
,a and Un
2
,b. Therefore, we cannot calculate E[Ucons | H ],
directly from E[Un
2
,a] and E[Un
2
,b]. We overcome this by showing that we show that conditioning on
H changes the expectation by a small amount for large n. We can approximate E[Un
2
,a+Un
2
,b |H ]
using the following equality
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b] = E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ] + E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ]
= E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ] +O(n) Pr[H ]
Lem. 8.8
= E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ]
(
1−O(e−Θ(n)))+O(ne−Θ(n)) (50)
Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] = E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ]
(50)
=
(
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b]−O
(
ne−n
2δ)) · (1−O(e−Θ(n)))−1
=
(
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b]−O
(
ne−n
2δ)) · (1 +O(e−Θ(n)))
= E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b] ·
(
1 +O(e−Θ(n))
)−O(ne−Θ(n)). (51)
We would later find a O(eδ−ε) factor (see Equation (57)) in our analysis. Note that we can ignore
the O(ne−Θ(n)) factors in the above equation in front of O(eδ−ε). For ease of notation, we omit
these factors in the next few equations, and approximate Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] by E[ Un
2
,a +Un
2
,b].
We explicitly account for them in Equation (56). Now, we can calculate Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] as
follows
Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] = E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b]
= E
[ n/2∑
i=1
W(i:n)v(a(i))
]
+ E
[ n/2∑
i=1
W(i:n)v(b(i))
]
=
n/2∑
i=1
(
E
[
W(i:n)v(a(i))
]
+ E
[
W(i:n)v(b(i))
])
.
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Before rewriting the sum, we note that for ease of notation we denote
⌊(
1/2 · (j + sk + 1)
)⌋
by(
1/2 · (j + sk + 1)
)
in the following equations.
Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] = 1
2
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
E
[
W( j+sk+1
2
:n
)v(a(1/2 · (j + sk + 1)))]
+ E
[
W( j+sk+1
2
:n
)v(b(1/2 · (j + sk + 1)))])
≥ 1
2
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
E
[
W( j+sk+1
2
:n
) · v(ek)]+ E [W( j+sk+1
2
:n
) · v(ek)] ).
Here, the last inequality follow since given H , for all j < nδ and k ∈ [n1−δ], a(1/2 · (j + sk + 1)) ∈
[sk, ek] and b
(
1/2 · (j + sk + 1)
) ∈ [sk, ek]. Next we have
Ew[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] ≥
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
E
[
W( j+sk+1
2
:n
) ] · v(ek) ). (52)
Consider x? := argmaxxW(x, v, w). By our assumption that vk ≥ vk+1, it follows that x? places
candidates in decreasing order of their latent utility (w), i.e., it places the i-th order statistic from
Ga ∪ Gb at the i-th position. Let us denote the i-th order statistic from the 2n values by V(i:2n).
Then UD,v(0, 1) := Ew
[W(x?, v, w)], of x? is
UD,v(0, 1) = E
[ n∑
i=1
V(i:2n) · v(i)
]
=
n∑
i=1
E[V(i:2n)] · v(i)
=
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
E[V(j+sk:2n)] · v(j + sk). (53)
Using Equations (52) and (53) we can calculate the difference in the expected utilities as
UD,v(0, 1)− Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ]
(52),(53)
≤
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
E[V(j+sk:2n)] · v(j + sk)−
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
E
[
W( j+sk+1
2
:n
)] · v(ek)
=
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
E[V(j+sk:2n)] · v(j + sk)− E
[
W( j+sk+1
2
:n
) ] · v(ek))
=
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
((
1− j + sk
2n+ 1
)
· v(j + sk)−
(
1− j + sk + 1
2(n+ 1)
)
· v(ek)
)
(∀ x, y ∈ Z, E[W(x:x+y)] = E[V(x:x+y)] = 1− xx+y+1)
=
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
1− j + sk + 1
2(n+ 1)
+
2n+ 1− j − sk
2(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)
)
· v(j + sk)−
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
1− j + sk + 1
2(n+ 1)
)
· v(ek)
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=
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
1− j + sk + 1
2(n+ 1)
+O(n−1)
)
· v(j + sk)−
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
1− j + sk + 1
2(n+ 1)
)
· v(ek)
≤
(
1− j + sk + 1
2(n+ 1)
)
·
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
v(j + sk)− v(ek)
)
+O(n−1) ·
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
v(j + sk)
≤ O(1) ·
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
(
v(j + sk)− v(ek)
)
+O(n−1) ·
n∑
i=1
v(i)
(15)
≤ O(1)
n1−δ∑
k=1
nδ∑
j=0
O(nδ)
(
v(j + sk)− v(j + sk + 1)
)
+O(n−1)
n∑
i=1
v(i) (Using |(j + sk)− ek| ≤ nδ)
≤ O(nδ) ·
n∑
i=1
(
v(i)− v(i+ 1))+O(n−1) · n∑
i=1
v(i)
(14)
≤ O(nδ−ε + n−1) ·
n∑
i=1
v(i). (54)
To show this difference in utilities is much smaller than the unconstrained utility, consider UD,v(0, 1) :=
Ew
[W(x?, v, w)],
UD,v(0, 1) = E
[ n∑
i=1
V(i:2n) · v(i)
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
V(i:2n)
] · v(i)
=
n∑
i=1
(
1− i
2n+ 1
)
· v(i)
≥ 1
2
n∑
i=1
v(i). (55)
Using Equations (54) and (55) we have
Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] ≥ UD,v(0, 1)−O(nδ−ε) n∑
i=1
v(i)
(55)
= UD,v(0, 1) ·
(
1−O(nδ−ε + n−1)).
Adding the additional errors terms from Equation (51) we have
Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] = UD,v(0, 1) · (1−O(nδ−ε + n−1)) · (1 +O(e−Θ(n)))−O(ne−Θ(n)) (56)
= UD,v(0, 1) ·
(
1−O(nδ−ε + n−1) +O(e−Θ(n)))−O(ne−Θ(n))
Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] = UD,v(0, 1) · (1−O(nδ−ε + n−1))−O(ne−Θ(n)). (57)
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Finally, using the fact that H occurs with high probability from Equation (49) we have
UD,v(α?, β) = Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)] = Ew [W(xcons, v, w)|H ] Pr[H ] + Ew [W(xcons, v, w)|H ] Pr[H ]
= Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] Pr[H ] +O(n) Pr[H ]
Prop. 8.8
= Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] · (1−O(e−Θ(n))) +O(n) ·O(e−Θ(n))
= Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ] +O(ne−Θ(n))
(55)
= UD,v(0, 1) ·
(
1−O(nδ−ε + n−1))−O(ne−Θ(n)) +O(ne−Θ(n)).
Fixing δ = ε/2, we have
UD,v(α?, β) = UD,v(0, 1) ·
(
1−O(n−ε/2 + n−1))+O(ne−Θ(n))
= UD,v(0, 1) ·
(
1−O(n−ε/2 + n−1)).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3 when ma = mb = n.
8.3.5 Proof of Proposition 8.5
Proof. Let µ := E[N ] = n(1 − β). Let E be the event that |N − µ| ≤ n1/2+δ. Using Hoeffding’s
inequality [9] and the fact that Na1
d
= Binomial(n, 1− β) from Proposition 8.6 we have
Pr[E ] = Pr[ |Na1 − µ| ≤ n1/2+δ ] ≥ 1− 2e−2n
2δ
(58)
Pr[E ] = Pr[ |Na1 − µ| > n1/2+δ ] ≤ 2e−2n
2δ
. (59)
From these we can prove Equation (38) as follows
E
[
n
2n−N
]
= E
[
n
2n−N
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ] + E [ n2n−N
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ]
= E
[
n
2n−N
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ] + Pr[E ] (∀ 0 ≤ N ≤ n, n2n−N ≤ 1)
(59)
= E
[
n
2n−N
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ] +O(e−n2δ)
(58)
= E
[
n
2n−N
∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
µ:=n(1−β)
= E
[
n
n(1 + β)− (N − µ)
∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
= E
[
1
1 + β
· 1
1− (N−µ)/(n+nβ)
∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
= E
[
1
1 + β
c ·
(
1 +
(N − µ)
n(1 + β)
+O
(
(N − µ)2
n2
))∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
(Using ∀ x ∈ [0, 1), 11+x = 1− x+O(x2))
= E
[
1
1 + β
·
(
1 +O
(
n−1/2+δ
))∣∣∣∣ E ]+O(e−n2δ) (Given E , N − µ ≤ n1/2+δ)
=
1
1 + β
+O
(
n−1/2+δ
)
+O
(
e−n
2δ)
δ>0
=
1
1 + β
+O
(
n−1/2+δ
)
. (60)
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Setting δ := 18 we have
E
[
n
2n−N
]
=
1
1 + β
+O
(
n−3/8
)
.
Further, we can prove Equation (39) as follows
E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
]
= E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ] + E [ n2(2n−N)2 | E
]
· Pr[E ]
= E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ] + Pr[E ] (∀ 0 ≤ N ≤ n, n2n−N ≤ 1)
(59)
= E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
∣∣∣∣ E ] · Pr[E ] +O(e−n2δ)
(58)
= E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
µ:=n(1−β)
= E
[
n2
(n(1 + β)− (N − µ))2
∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ)) +O(e−n2δ)
= E
[
1
(1 + β)2
1(
1− (N−µ)/n(1+β))2
∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ)) +O(e−n2δ)
E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
]
= E
[
1
(1 + β)2
(
1 +
(N − µ)
n(1 + β)
+O
(
n−1+2δ
))2 ∣∣∣∣ E ] · (1−O(e−n2δ)) +O(e−n2δ)
(Using ∀x ∈ [0, 1), 11+x = 1− x+O(x2))
= E
[
1
(1 + β)2
· (1 +O(n−1/2+δ))2 ∣∣∣∣ E ](1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
(Given E , N − µ ≤ n1/2+δ)
= E
[
1
(1 + β)2
· (1 +O(n−1/2+δ)) ∣∣∣∣ E ](1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
=
1
(1 + β)2
· (1 +O(n−1/2+δ)) · (1−O(e−n2δ))+O(e−n2δ)
δ>0
=
1
(1 + β)2
· (1 +O(n−1/2+δ))+O(e−n2δ)
δ>0
=
1
(1 + β)2
· (1 +O(n−1/2+δ)).
Setting δ := 1/8 we have
E
[
n2
(2n−N)2
]
=
1
(1 + β)2
· (1 +O(n−3/8)).
8.3.6 Proof of Proposition 8.6
Proof. We prove each of the Equations (40), (41) and (42) in the following sections.
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Proof of Equation (40). We can express Na1 as a sum of the following n random variables
Na1 =
∑
i∈Ga
I[Wi ∈ (β, 1]].
Since Wi are drawn iid from U [0, 1], it follows that for W d= U [0, 1]
Na1 = n · I[W ∈ (β, 1]].
Since I[W ∈ (β, 1]] a bernoulli random variable, which is 1 with probability (1 − β) and 0 with
probability β, it follows that
Na1
d
= Binomial(n, 1− β).
Proof of Equations (41) and (42). We would require the following proposition
Proposition 8.9. (Truncated uniform distribution). Let W
d
= U [0, 1], then for all 0 < u <
v < 1,
(
W | W ∈ [u, v]) d= U [u, v].
Proof. For any k ∈ [u, v] we have,
Pr[ W ≤ k | W ∈ [u, v] ] = Pr[ W ≤ k ∧W ∈ [u, v] ]
Pr[ W ∈ [u, v] ] =
k − u
v − u.
Comparing the above with the cdf of U [u, v] we have (W | W ∈ [u, v]) d= U [u, v].
Conditioning on Na1 fixes the number of candidates (all from Ga) with utility in [β, 1]. From
Proposition 8.9 we have that for all i ∈ Ga and j ∈ Gb
(wi | wi ∈ [0, β]) d= U [0, β] d= wjβ d= wˆj .
In other words, all the candidates with utilities in [0, β] (n candidates fromGb and n−Na1 candidates
in Ga) have the same distribution of observed utilities conditioned on Na1 . Consider the ordered
list of these 2n−Na1 candidates in decreasing order of their observed utilities (breaking ties with
unbiased coin tosses). Since, all observed utilities are drawn iid each permutation of these candidates
is equally likely.
We choose the top n − Na1 candidates from this list to complete our ranking (which has Na1
candidates as of now). The number of ways of choosing k candidates from the n in Gb is
(
n
k
)
,
and the number of ways of choosing the other n−Na1 − k candidates from the n−Na−1 in Ga is( n−Na1
n−Na1−k
)
. Since each of these colorings is equally likely it follows that
Pr[Nb = k | Na1 ] =
( n−Na1
n−Na1−k
)(
n
k
)
(2n−Na1
n−Na1
) = (n−Na1k )( nn−k)(2n−Na1
n
) .
Given numbers N,K, n, for an hypergeometric random variable, HG, we have: ∀max(0, n+
K −N) ≤ k ≤ min(K,n)
Pr[HG = k] :=
(
K
k
)(
N−K
n−k
)(
N
n
) . (61)
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By comparing with Equation (61), we can observe that conditioned on Na1 , Nb is a hypergeo-
metric random variable. We would soon use this fact to show that Nb is concentrated around its
mean. But, first we would calculate its mean9.
Let Xi(k) be a random variable which is 1 if candidate i is in the first k positions out of 2n−Na1 ,
and 0 otherwise. Since, each permutation of these candidates is equally likely it follows that
For all i ∈ (Ga ∪Gb)\Sa1 , Pr[Xi(k) = 1 | Na1 ] =
k
2n−Na1
.
Expressing Nb as
∑
i∈Gb Xi(n−Na1) we have
E[Nb|Na1 ] = E
[ ∑
i∈Gb
Xi(n−Na1)|Na1
]
=
∑
i∈Gb
E[Xi(n−Na1)|Na1 ]
= n · n−Na1
2n−Na1
. (62)
Recall that Na1
d
= Binomial(n, 1− β) from Proposition 8.6. Taking the expectation of these we get
E[Nb] = E[ E[Nb|Na1 ] ] = nE
[
1− n
2n−Na1
]
. (63)
Fact 8.5
= n · (β/1+β +O(n−3/8)).
This completes the proof of Equation (41) and gives us the mean of E[Nb]. We proceed to show
that Nb is concentrated around this mean.
From our earlier observation that Nb follows a hypergeometric distribution and using known
tail bounds for the hypergeometric distribution (see Theorem 1 in [30]) we have
Pr[ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k | Na1 ]
Thm. 1 [30]
≥ 1− 2e−
2(k2−1)
n−Na1 . (64)
However, the above concentration bound is not very useful unless we remove the conditioning on
Na1 . To do this, we generalize the conditioning in the above to a lowerbound on Na1
Pr
[
|Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k
∣∣∣∣ Na1 ≥ E[Na1 ]− k ].
We lowerbound the above probability by choosing the smallest value of Na1 , Na1 = E[Na1 ] − k in
Equation (64) to get
Pr
[
|Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k
∣∣∣∣ Na1 ≥ E[Na1 ]− k ] ≥ 1− 2e− 2(k2−1)n−E[Na1 ]+k .
Finally, we remove the conditioning in the above using the concentration of Nb and a union bound.
Let E be the event that Na1 ≥ E[Na1 ] − k. Using Hoeffding’s inequality [9] and the fact that
Na1
d
= Binomial(n, 1− β) we have
Pr[E ] = Pr[ Na1 ≥ E[Na1 ]− k ] ≥ 1− e−2k
2/n. (65)
9Note that using the mean of the hypergeometric distribution we get E[Nb|Na1 ] and not E[Nb].
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Using this we can calculate Pr[ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k ] as follows
Pr
[ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k ] = Pr [ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k ∣∣ E ] · Pr [E ]+ Pr [ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k ∣∣ E ] · Pr [E ]
≥ Pr [ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ k ∣∣ E ] · Pr [E ]
(64),(65)
≥ (1− 2e− 2(k2−1)n−E[Na1 ]+k ) · (1− e−2k2/n)
≥ 1− 2e−
2(k2−1)
n−E[Na1 ]+k − e−2k2/n
≥ 1− 2e−
2(k2−1)
nβ+k − e−2k2/n. (66)
Substituting k = n1/2+δ we get
Pr
[ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ n1/2+δ ] = 1− 2e− 2(k2−1)nβ+k − e−2k2/n
≥ 1− 2e− k
2−1
nβ − e−2k2/n (k < nβ)
= 1− 2e 1nβ e− k
2
nβ − e−2k2/n
= 1−O(e−k2/n) (β ∈ (0, 1])
= 1−O(e−n2δ). (k := n1/2+δ)
Setting δ = 1/8 have
Pr
[ |Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ n5/8 ] = 1−O(e−n1/4).
This completes the proof of Equation (42) and also of Proposition 8.6.
8.4 Proof of Equations (16) and (17)
We begin by restating the two equations
UD,v(α?, β) = n
(
1− n
2(ma +mb)
+O
(
n−3/8
))
, (Utility with constraints, 67)
UD,v(0, β) =

ma(1−β2)
2 +
maβ2+mb
2
[
1− (ma+mb−n)2
(maβ+mb)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
, c = n− ω(n5/8)
n
(
1− n2ma +O
(
n−3/8
))
, c ≥ n+ Θ(n5/8).
(Utility without constraints, 68)
Recall that these equations hold when vk = 1 ∀ k ∈ [n] and we define c := ma(1− β). We first give
the proof for the special case where ma = mb = n and then show how to extend this proof to the
general case with (ma 6= mb 6= n) in Section 8.4.4. We split this into the following lemmas, one for
each equation.
Lemma 8.10. (Expected latent utility without constraints). Given β ∈ (0, 1], representing
the implicit bias, we have UD,1(0, β) is
UD,1(0, β) =
n
2
(
1 +
2β
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
))
. (69)
Lemma 8.11. (Expected latent utility with constraints). Given β ∈ (0, 1), representing the
implicit bias, we have UD,1(α?, β) is
UD,1(α?, β) =
3n
4
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)(
1 +O
(
e−n
1/4))
. (70)
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8.4.1 Notation
We recall that we have two groups of candidates Ga and Gb, with |Ga| := n and |Gb| := n, where Gb
is the underprivileged group. The latent utility of candidates in both groups Ga and Gb is drawn
from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Let wi be the random variable representing the latent utility
of a candidate i ∈ Ga ∪ Gb. Due to implicit bias the observed utility of a candidate j ∈ Gb, wˆj is
their latent utility, wj , multiplied by β ∈ [0, 1], whereas the observed utility of a candidate i ∈ Ga
is equal to their latent utility, wi.
We consider the top n candidates in decreasing order of their observed utilities. Let Sa ⊆ Ga
and Sb ⊆ Gb be the set of candidates selected from Ga and Gb respectively. Let Sa1 ⊆ Sa and
Sa2 ⊆ Sa be the set of candidates selected from Ga with utilities larger or equal to and strictly
smaller than β respectively. Observe that Sa1 ∪Sa2 = Sa. We define the following random variables
counting the number of candidates selected
1. Na := |Sa|,
2. Nb := |Sb|,
3. Na1 := |Sa1 |,
4. Na2 := |Sa2 |.
Further define random variables Ua1 , Ua2 , and Ub representing the utilities of selected candidates
without position-discount as
1. Ua :=
∑
i∈Sa wi,
2. Ub :=
∑
j∈Sb wj ,
3. Ua1 :=
∑
i∈Sa1 wi,
4. Ua2 :=
∑
i∈Sa2 wi.
Here, Ua1 , Ua2 and Ub represent the latent utilities of the candidates selected from Ga with observed
utilities higher than β, those selected from the other n−Na1 candidates of Ga, and those selected
from all n candidates from Gb respectively.
Let
x?(v, w) := argmax
x
W(x, v, w)
be the ranking that maximizes the latent utility. Further, let
xcons(α
?, v, w) := argmax
x∈K(L(α?))
W(x, v, wˆ)
be the optimal constrained ranking optimizing wˆ, and
xuncons(v, w) := argmax
x
W(x, v, wˆ)
be the optimal unconstrained ranking maximizing wˆ. When v and w are clear from the context we
write x?, xuncons, and when α
? is also clear we write xcons.
Given a draw of utility, w, we have W(xuncons, v, w) = Ua1 +Ua2 +Ub. Then the total expected
latent utilities, UD,1(0, β) and UD,1(α?, β), are
1. UD,1(0, β) := Ew[W(xuncons, v, w)] = E[Ua1 + Ua2 + Ub]
2. UD,1(α?, β) := Ew[W(xcons, v, w)].
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8.4.2 Proof of Lemma 8.10
Proof of Lemma 8.10. We can calculate E[U ] assuming the following equations
E[Ua1 ] =
n
2
(1− β2) (71)
E[Ua2 ] =
n
2
[
β2 − β
2
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
(72)
E[Ub] =
n
2
[
1− 1
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
. (73)
Assuming the above we get
E[U ] = E[Ua1 + Ua2 + Ub]
= E[Ua1 ] + E[Ua2 ] + E[Ub]
(71),(72),(73)
=
n(1− β2)
2
+
n
2
[
β2 − β
2
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
+
n
2
[
1− 1
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
=
3n
4
(
1 +
(1− β)2
3(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
))
.
We devote the rest of the proof to deriving Equations (71), (72), and (73).
Proof of Equation (71). Fix a value of Na1 , by definition this also fixes the size of Sa1 . Then,
from the definition of Ua1 we have
E[Ua1 | Na1 ] = E
[∑
i∈Sa1wi | Na1
]
= E
[∑
i∈Sa1 E[wi | i ∈ Sa1 ] | Na1
]
= E
[∑
i∈Sa1 E[wi | wi ∈ [β, 1]] | Na1
]
.
Define a random variable W
d
= U [0, 1] then we have
E[Ua1 | Na1 ] = E
[∑
i∈Sa1 E[W | W ∈ [β, 1]] | Na1
]
= E
[∑
i∈Sa1 1 | Na1
] · E[W | W ∈ [β, 1]]
= Na1 · E[W | W ∈ [β, 1]] (|Sa1 | := Na1 .)
Prop 8.9
= Na1
∫ 1
β
x
1− βdx
=
1
2
·Na1(1 + β).
Taking the expectation over Na1 we get
E[Ua1 ] = E[ E[Ua1 | Na1 ] ] =
1
2
E[Na1 ](1 + β)
(40)
=
n
2
(1− β2).
This proves Equation (71).
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Proof of Equations (72) and (73). We recall that all candidates in Ga have the same observed
and latent utility, whereas all candidates in Gb have an observed utility which is β times their latent
utility. Therefore, Ua2 and βUb are the total observed utility of candidates in Sa2 and Sb.
From Proposition 8.9 we know that for all i ∈ Ga and j ∈ Gb
(wi | wi ∈ [0, β]) d= U [0, β] d= wjβ d= wˆj .
In other words, that conditioned on Na1 , the observed utilities of all candidates not in Sa1 follows
the uniform distribution on [0, β]. It follows that the expected observed utility, E[Ua2 + β · Ub],
is the expected value of the (n −Na1) largest order statistics from a total of (2n −Na1) draws of
U [0, β]. Define a random variable Zk to be the k-th largest observed utility from the union of the
(n−Na1) candidates from Ga\Sa1 and n candidates from Gb. Then we have
E[ Ua2 | Na1 ] + β E[ Ub | Na1 ] = E[ Ua2 + β · Ub | Na1 ]
=
∑n−Na1
k=1
E[Zk]
=
∑n−Na1
k=1
∫ β
0
x · x2n−Na1−k(β − x)k−1dx
= β
∑n−Na1
k=1
2n−Na1 + 1− k
2n−Na1 + 1
= β
(
n−Na1 −
(n−Na1+1
2
)
2n−Na1 + 1
)
. (74)
Further, from symmetry we expect the ratio of E[Ua2 |Na1 ] and E[β · Ub|Na1 ] will be the same as
the ratio of the number of candidates, i.e., (n−Na1 )/n. We can rigorously verify this as follows
E[ Ua2 | Na1 ] = E
[ ∑
i∈Ga\Sa1 E
[
Wi · I[Wi ≥ Zn−Na1 ]
] ]
= E
[ ∑
i∈Ga\Sa1
∫ β
0 x · xn−Na1−1dx
]
= E
[ ∑
i∈Ga\Sa1 1
] · ∫ β0 x · xn−Na1−1dx
= |Ga\Sa1 | ·
∫ β
0
x · xn−Na1−1dx
= (n−Na1) ·
∫ β
0
x · xn−Na1−1dx
E[ βUb | Na1 ] = E
[ ∑
j∈Gb E
[
Vˆj · I[Vˆj ≥ Zn−Na1 ]
] ]
= E
[ ∑
i∈Gb
∫ β
0 x · xn−Na1−1dx
]
= E
[ ∑
i∈Ga\Sa1 1
] · ∫ β0 x · xn−Na1−1dx
= |Gb| ·
∫ β
0
x · xn−Na1−1dx
= n ·
∫ β
0
x · xn−Na1−1dx.
Taking the ratio of the above two equations we get
E[Ua2 |Na1 ]
n−Na1
=
E[βUb|Na1 ]
n
. (75)
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From Equations (74) and (75) we have
E[Ua2 | Na1 ] = β
n−Na1
2n−Na1
(
n−Na1 −
(n−Na1+1
2
)
2n−Na1 + 1
)
E[Ub | Na1 ] =
n
2n−Na1
(
n−Na1 −
(n−Na1+1
2
)
2n−Na1 + 1
)
.
We can rewrite the above as follows
E[Ub | Na1 ] =
n
2
[
1− n
2
(2n−Na1)2
+O(n−1)
]
(76)
E[Ua2 | Na1 ]
β
=
n
2
[
2− n
2n−Na1
+O(n−1)
]
− Na1
2
− E[Ub|Na1 ]. (77)
We give the details of the rearrangement in Section 8.4.5. Now, calculating the expectation of
Equations (76) and (77) we get
E[Ub] = E[ E[Ub | Na1 ] ]
n
2
− n
2
E
[
n2
(2n−Na1)2
+O(n−1)
]
(39)
=
n
2
[
1− 1
(1 + β)2
+O
(
n−3/8
)]
(78)
E[Ua2 ] = E[E[Ua2 | Na1 ]]
= nβ
[
1− 1
2
E
[
n
2n−Na1
]
+O(n−1)
]
− β E[Na1 ]
2
− β E[E[Ub|Na1 ]]
= nβ
[
1− 1
2
E
[
n
2n−Na1
]
+O(n−1)
]
− β E[Na1 ]
2
− β E[Ub]
(38),(40),(78)
= nβ
[
1− 1
2(1 + β)
+O
(
1
n
)]
− nβ(1− β)
2
− nβ
2
[
1− 1
(1 + β)2
+O(n−
3
8 )
]
= nβ
[
1− 1
2(1 + β)
− (1− β)
2
− 1
2
+
1
2(1 + β)2
+O(n−3/8)
]
= nβ
[
1
2
− 1
2(1 + β)
− (1− β)
2
+
1
2(1 + β)2
+O(n−3/8)
]
= nβ
[
1
2
− β
2(1 + β)2
− (1− β)
2
+O(n−3/8)
]
= nβ
[
β
2
− β
2(1 + β)2
+O(n−3/8)
]
=
nβ2
2
[
1
2
− 1
2(1 + β)2
+O(n−3/8)
]
. (79)
This completes the proof of Equations (72) and (73), as well as Lemma 8.10.
8.4.3 Proof of Lemma 8.11
Proof. Consider the observed utilities {wi}i∈Ga and {wi}i∈Gb of candidates in Ga and Gb. Let Zk
be the k-th largest latent utility from {wi}i∈Ga ∪ {wi}i∈Gb .10
10Note this Zk is different from the Zk defined in Section 8.4.2.
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Define H to be the event that Nb =
∑
j∈Gb I[wˆj ≥ Zn] ≤ n/2. Notice that H implies that∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n](xuncons)ij ≤ n/2.
Proposition 8.12. Given H ,
∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n](xcons)ij = n/2, i.e., it ranks exactly n/2 candidates from
Gb in the top-n positions.
Proof. Since xcons satisfies the constraint we have∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n](xcons)ij ≥ n/2. Assume that
∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n](xcons)ij = n/2 + j for any 0 < j ≤ n/2. Then we
would create a ranking xˆ such that W(xˆ, v, wˆ) >W(xcons, v, wˆ) and
∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n](xˆ)ij = n/2 + j − 1.
Contradicting the optimality of xcons.
Let w1 > w2 > · · · > wn ∈ [0, 1] and vˆ1 > vˆ2 > · · · > vˆn ∈ [0, β] be the observed utilities of
all candidates in Ga and Gb respectively. Conditioned on H , xuncons ranked w(n/2−j) in the top-n
positions but didn’t rank vˆ(n/2+j). Therefore, we must have w(n/2−j) > vˆ(n/2+j).
Since the utilities are in strictly decreasing, we claim that xcons ranks exactly (n/2+j) candidates
from Gb with the observed utilities {vˆ1, vˆ2, · · · , vˆn/2+j}. Similarly, xcons ranks the candidates with
observed utilities {w1, w2, · · · , wn/2−j} from Ga.
Construct xˆ by swapping the positions of vˆn/2+j and wn/2−j+1 in xcons. Then we have
W(xˆ, v, wˆ) =W(xcons, v, wˆ) + vˆ(n/2+j) − w(n/2−j)
>W(xcons, v, wˆ).
For all k ∈ [n] and s ∈ {a, b}, let Uk,s be the latent utility of the k candidates with the highest
utility in Gs. Then from Proposition 8.12 the expected latent utility of the constrained ranking
given H
E[Ucons | H ] = E[Un/2,a + Un/2,b | H ].
However, H is not independent of Un/2,a and Un/2,b. Therefore, we cannot calculate E[Ucons | H ],
directly from E[Un/2,a] and E[Un/2,b]. We overcome this by showing that we show that conditioning
on H changes the expectation by a small amount for large n. Towards this, we first show that
H occurs with high probability, and then, we using the fact that the utility is bounded we get the
required result.
Pr[H ] = Pr
[
Nb ≤ n
2
]
Prop. 8.6
= Pr
[
Nb − E[Nb] ≤ n
(
1
2
− β
1 + β
+O
(
n−3/8
)) ]
≥ Pr
[
|Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ n
(
1− β
2(1 + β)
+O
(
n−3/8
)) ]
.
Since β ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, we have that n( 1−β2(1+β) + O(n−3/8)) = Θ(n). Therefore, from using
Equation (42) of Proposition 8.6 we have
Pr[H ] = Pr[Nb ≤ n/2]
Prop.8.6
≥ 1−O(e−n1/4). (80)
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We have shown that H occurs with high probability. Now, we can approximate E[Un
2
,a+Un
2
,b |H ]
using the following equality
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b] = E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ] + E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ]
= E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ] +O(n) Pr[H ]
= E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] ·
(
1−O(e−n1/4))+O(n) ·O(e−n1/4)
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] =
(
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b]−O
(
ne−n
1/4))) · (1−O(e−n1/4))−1
=
(
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b]−O
(
ne−n
1/4))) · (1 +O(e−n1/4))
= E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b] ·
(
1 +O
(
e−n
1/4))−O(ne−n1/4)). (81)
Here, we can calculate unconditioned expectation E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b] using the expectations of order
statistics of the uniform distribution as follows
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b] = E[ Un
2
,a ] + E[ Un
2
,b ]
=
∑n/2
k=1
n+ 1− k
n+ 1
+
∑n/2
k=1
n+ 1− k
n+ 1
=
3n
4
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)
)
.
Then using Equation (81) we have
E[ Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] =
(
3n
4
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)
)
−O(e−n1/4))) · (1 +O(e−n1/4))
=
3n
4
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)
)
· (1 +O(e−n1/4))−O(ne−n2δ)
=
3n
4
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)
)
· (1 +O(e−n1/4)). (82)
Using this to approximate the utility we get
UD,1(α?, β) = E[Ucons] = E[Ucons | H ] Pr[H ] + E[Ucons | H] Pr[H ]
= E[Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ] + E[Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ]
= E[Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ] Pr[H ] +O(n) Pr[H ]
(80)
= E[Un
2
,a + Un
2
,b | H ]
(
1−O(e−n1/4))+O(n) ·O(e−n1/4)
(82)
=
3n
4
·
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)
· (1−O(e−n1/4))2 +O(n) ·O(e−n1/4)
=
3n
4
·
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)
· (1− 2O(e−n1/4)+O(e−n4δ))+O(n) ·O(e−n1/4)
=
3n
4
·
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)
· (1−O(e−n1/4))+O(n) ·O(e−n1/4)
=
3n
4
·
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)
· (1−O(e−n1/4)+O(e−n1/4))
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=
3n
4
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)(
1 +O
(
e−n
1/4))
=
3n
4
(
1− 1
n+ 1
+O
(
e−n
1/4))
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.11.
8.4.4 Extending the proof to ma 6= mb 6= n
The core ideas of proof do not change when we extend it to the setting with ma 6= mb 6= n. In
this section, we discuss the key-points where the proof changes or involves a non-trivial general-
ization of the techniques. We begin by stating (without proof) straightforward generalizations of
Proposition 8.5 and Proposition 8.6 which would be useful.
Proposition 8.13. Let β ∈ (0, 1), N ∼ Binomial(ma, 1− β) and r ∈ R, then for any δ > 0
E
[
1
r +N
]
=
1
r + E[N ]
[
1 +O
(
n−3/8
)]
, (83)
E
[
1
(r +N)2
]
=
1
(r + E[N ])2
[
1 +O
(
n−3/8
)]
. (84)
Proposition 8.14. (Expected number of candidates without constraints). Given a number
β ∈ (0, 1], representing the implicit bias, we have
Na1
d
= Binomial(ma, 1− β), (85)
E[Nb] ≤ mb
(
n−ma(1− β)
maβ +mb
)
+O
(
n−3/8
)
, (86)
Pr
[|Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ n5/8] ≥ 1−O(e−n1/4). (87)
Proof of Equation (16). The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we show that with
high probability xcons satisfies (similar to Section 8.4.3)∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n]
(xcons)ij = n · mb
(ma +mb)
.
Towards this, we define an event H ′ as Nb ≤ n · mb/(ma+mb) and show that H ′ occurs with
high probability. Then we generalize Proposition 8.12 to prove the claim. In the second step, we
calculate Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)|H ′] conditioned on H ′. Since, H ′ occurs with high probability and
UD,1(α?, β) is bounded, it follows that
UD,1(α?, β) = Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)] ≈ Ew [W(xcons, v, w)|H ′].
Step 1. Define H ′ to be the event that Nb ≤ n · mb/(ma+mb), i.e.,∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n]
(xuncons)ij ≤ n · mb
(ma +mb)
.
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Notice from Equation (86), that E[Nb] ≤ n−Θ(n). With some simple manipulation we will get
Pr[H ′] := Pr
[
Nb ≤ n · mb
ma +mb
]
≥ Pr[|Nb − E[Nb]| ≤ Θ(n)]
≥ 1−O(e−n1/4).
We can generalize Proposition 8.12 into the following.
Proposition 8.15. Given H ′, we have∑
i∈Gb,j∈[n]
(xcons)ij = n · mb
(ma +mb)
,
i.e., xcons ranks exactly n · mb(ma+mb) candidates from Gb in the top-n positions.
This follows from the proof of Proposition 8.12 by replacing n by ma and mb at when ever it
refers to the size of the groups. This will complete the first step.
Step 2. Define η := n/ma+mb. We can calculate E[Umaη,a + Umbη,b] as follows
E[Umaη,a + Umbη,b] =
η·ma∑
k=1
ma + 1− k
ma + 1
+
η·mb∑
k=1
mb + 1− k
mb + 1
= n
[
1− n
2(ma +mb)
+O(n−1)
]
.
Where the first equality follows from the expectation of order statistics of the uniform distribution.
Finally, following the arguments used to derive Equation (81) we have that
UD,1(α?, β) = Ew
[W(xcons, v, w)]
= Ew
[W(xcons, v, w) | H ] +O(ne−n1/4)
= Ew
[
Umaη,a + Umbη,b | H ] +O
(
ne−n
1/4)
= Ew
[
Umaη,a + Umbη,b] +O
(
ne−n
1/4)
= n
[
1− n
2(ma +mb)
+O(n−1)
]
.
This will complete the proof of Equation (16).
Proof of Equation (17). Define
c := E[Na1 ]
(85)
= ma(1− β).
We consider two cases when c ≥ n+ Θ(n5/8) and c = n− ω(n5/8). We discuss outline the proof for
each case separately.
Case A (c ≥ n+ Θ(n5/8)): From Proposition 8.14 we have that
E[Na1 ] ≥ n+ Θ(n5/8).
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Define E ′ to be the event that Na1 ≥ n−Θ(n5/8). Applying Hoeffding’s we find
Pr[E ′] = Pr[Na1 ≥ n−Θ(n5/8)] ≥ Pr[Na1 − E[Na1 ] ≥ Θ(n5/8)] (Using E[Na1 ] = c ≥ n+ Θ(n5/8))
≥ 1−O(e−n5/4ma )
≥ 1−O(e−n1/4). (88)
We can show that conditioned on E ′,
Ua2 = O(n
−3/8) and Ub = O(n−
3/8).
Therefore Ua2 and Ub have small contributions to the utility. Further, since E
′ occurs with a high
probability and UD,1(0, β) is bounded, we have that
UD,1(0, β) = Ew
[W(xuncons, v, w)] ≈ Ew [W(xuncons, v, w)|E ′].
Finally, calculating E
[
Ua1 |E ′] will give us the required equation.
Formally,
UD,1(0, β) = Ew
[W(xuncons, v, w)]
= Ew
[W(xuncons, v, w)|E ′] Pr[E ′] +O(n) Pr[E ′]
= E
[
Ua1 + Ua2 + Ub|E ′] ·
(
1 +O
(
e−n
1/4))
+O
(
ne−n
1/4)
= E
[
Ua1 |E ′] ·
(
1 +O
(
e−n
1/4))
+O(n
5/8) +O
(
ne−n
1/4)
.
Conditioned on E ′ we can bound the utility E
[
Ua1 |E ′] between the following
E
[
Ua1 |E ′] ≤ E
[
Ua1 |Na1 = n]
=
n∑
k=1
ma + 1− k
ma + 1
= n
[
1− n/(2ma) +O(n−1)
]
(89)
E
[
Ua1 |E ′] ≥ E
[
Ua1 |Na1 = n−Θ(n5/8)]
=
n−Θ(n5/8)∑
k=1
ma + 1− k
ma + 1
= n
[
1− n/(2ma) + Θ(n−3/8)
]
. (90)
Combining Equation (89) and Equation (90) we get
E
[
Ua1 |E ′]
(89),(90)
= n · [1− n/(2ma) +O(n−3/8)]
UD,1(0, β) = n
[
1− n/(2ma) +O
(
n−3/8
)](
1 +O
(
e−n
1/4))
+O(n
5/8 + ne−n
1/4
)
= n
[
1− n/(2ma) +O
(
n−3/8
)]
.
This will complete the proof for Case A.
Case B (c = n−ω(n5/8)): Note that this case encapsulates the setting with ma = mb = n. Unlike
the special case (ma = mb = n), here we could have which implies Na2 = Nb = 0. Define
E ′′ as the event Na1 > n. We show that E ′′ occurs with a low probability, and so has a small
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impact on UD,1(0, β). Having handled this, we follow the proof for the special case (ma = mb = n),
substituting n by ma and mb when it is used to refer to the group sizes.
Formally, we proceed as follows
Pr[E ′′] = 1− Pr[Na1 ≤ n]
= 1− Pr[Na1 − E[Na1 ] ≤ ω(n5/8)]
≤ O(e−n1/4)
UD,1(0, β) = Ew
[W(xuncons, v, w)]
= Ew
[W(xuncons, v, w)|E ′′] Pr[E ′′] + Ew [W(xuncons, v, w)|E ′′] Pr[E ′′]
= Ew
[W(xuncons, v, w)|E ′′] · (1−O(e−n1/4))+O(ne−n1/4)
= E
[
Ua1 + Ua2 + Ub|E ′′] ·
(
1−O(e−n1/4))+O(ne−n1/4).
Next, we calculate E
[
Ua1 |E ′′], E
[
Ua2 |E ′′], and E
[
Ub|E ′′]. We follow the proof in Section 8.4.2. To
do so, we only need the additional fact that n ≤ min(ma,mb).11 This will give us
E
[
Ua1 |E ′′] = Ek
[
E
[
Ua1 | E ′′, Na1 = k]
]
= Ek
[
Na1 · (1+β)/2 | E ′′
]
=
(1 + β)
2
· (ma(1− β) +O(ne−n1/4)) · (1 +O(e−n1/4))
=
ma
2
(1− β2) +O(ne−n1/4), (91)
E
[
Ua2 |E ′′] = Ek
[
E
[
Ua2 | E ′′, Na1 = k]
]
=
mb
2
− mb
2
E
[
(ma +mb − n)2
(ma +mb −Na1)2
+O(n−1)
]
=
mb
2
[
1− (ma +mb − n)
2
(maβ +mb)2
· (1 +O(n−3/8))], (92)
E
[
Ua2 |E ′′] = Ek
[
E
[
Ua2 | E ′′, Na1 = k]
]
=
β
2
(n− E[Na1 |E ′′])− β Ek
[
E
[
Ua2 |E ′′, Na1 = k]
]
+
β
2
(ma +mb − n)
[
1− E
[
(ma +mb + 1− n)
ma +mb −Na1 + 1
]]
=
maβ
2
2
[
1− (ma +mb − n)
2
(maβ +mb)2
· (1 +O(n−3/8))]. (93)
Combining equations (91), (92), and (93) we get
UD,1(0, β) = E
[
Ua1 + Ua2 + Ub | E ′′] ·
(
1−O(e−n1/4))+O(ne−n1/4)
=
ma
2
(1− β2) + maβ
2 +ma
2
[
1− (ma +mb − n)
2
(maβ +mb)2
· (1 +O(n−3/8))].
This will complete the proof of Case B and also of Equation (17).
11This is for ease of notation, otherwise the error terms would involve ma, mb, and n.
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8.4.5 Details omitted from equations (76) and (77)
E[Ub | Na1 ] =
n
2n−Na1
(
n−Na1 −
(n−Na1 + 1)(n−Na1)
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
)
= n− n
2
2n−Na1
− n(n−Na1 + 1)(n−Na1)
2(2n−Na1)(2n−Na1 + 1)
= n− n
2
2n−Na1
− n(n−Na1 + 1)
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
+
n2(n−Na1 + 1)
2(2n−Na1)(2n−Na1 + 1)
=
n
2
− n
2
2n−Na1
− n
2
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
+
n2
2(2n−Na1)
− n
3
2(2n−Na1)(2n−Na1 + 1)
=
n
2
− n
2
2(2n−Na1)
− n
2
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
− n
3
2(2n−Na1)(2n−Na1 + 1)
=
n
2
+
n2
2(2n−Na1 + 1)(2n−Na1)
− n
3
2(2n−Na1)(2n−Na1 + 1)
=
n
2
[
1− n
2
(2n−Na1)(2n−Na1 + 1)
+O(n−1)
]
=
n
2
[
1− n
2
(2n−Na1)2
+
n2
(2n−Na1)2(2n−Na1 + 1)
+O(n−1)
]
=
n
2
[
1− n
2
(2n−Na1)2
+O(n−1)
]
.
1
β
E[Ua2 | Na1 ] =
n−Na1
2n−Na1
(
n−Na1 −
(n−Na1 + 1)(n−Na1)
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
)
= n−Na1 −
(n−Na1 + 1)(n−Na1)
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
− E[Ub | Na1 ]
= n−Na1 −
(n−Na1)
2
+
n(n−Na1)
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
− E[Ub | Na1 ]
= n−Na1 −
(n−Na1)
2
+
n
2
− n(n+ 1)
2(2n−Na1 + 1)
− E[Ub|Na1 ]
= n− Na1
2
− n
2(2n−Na1)
[
n− n−Na1
(2n−Na1 + 1)
]
− E[Ub|Na1 ]
=
n
2
[
2− n
(2n−Na1)
+O(n−1)
]
− Na1
2
− E[Ub | Na1 ].
8.5 Fact 8.16 and its proof
The following fact shows that without any assumptions on w, any constraint K, such that
max
x∈K
W(x, v, wˆ) = max
x
W(x, v, w)
must be a function of w. Here, by x ∈ K we imply that x satisfies K.
Fact 8.16. (No fixed constraint can mitigate implicit bias for arbitrary utilities). There
exists a bias parameter {βs}ps=1 ∈ [0, 1), position-discount v, and two sets of utilities {wi}mi=1 and
47
{w′i}mi=1, such that, no constraint K can ensure the following together
W(x˜, v, w) = max
x
W(x, v, w) (94)
W(x˜′, v, w′) = max
x
W(x, v, w′), (95)
where x˜ := argmaxx∈KW(x, v, wˆ) and x˜′ := argmaxx∈KW(x, v, wˆ′).
Proof. Let m = n = 2 and v = {2, 1}, and suppose there are only two groups Ga = {1}, Gb = {2}
(p = 2). The implicit bias is βa = 1 and βb = 1/4, and the two utilities are w = {2, 1} and
w′ = {1, 2}. Consider the optimal rankings
x = argmax
x
W(x, v, w) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
x′ = argmax
x
W(x, v, w′) =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
x and x′ rank candidates in the decreasing order of their latent utilities, w and w′ respectively.
Therefore, they are optimal w and w′. Since they are also the only two possible rankings, we can
calculate their utilities to verify that they are unique maxima.
Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a constraint K which satisfies Equations (94)
and (95). Since x is a unique maximum, and the ranking x˜ ∈ K from the fact satisfies
W(x˜, v, w) =W(x, v, w).
Therefore, x˜ = x, i.e., x˜ ∈ K. Similarly, we have x′ ∈ K.
Consider the ranking x˜′ from the fact,
x˜′ := argmax
x∈K
W(x, v, wˆ′) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
The above ranking ranking candidates in decreasing order of wˆ. Therefore, it is optimal for wˆ.
Since W(x˜′, v, w′) = 4 < 5 =W(x′, v, w′), we have a contradiction.
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